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This Report was launched three 
years ago to fill a gap – the missing 
Armenian perspective to the body 
of analysis about Armenia and the 
region offered by the international 
community. 
These end-of-year reflections are intended to help 
grasp past policies and events, and serve as tools to 
shape the future.
2010 marked the culmination of nearly two decades 
of Armenia’s independence. Perhaps for that 
reason, given independent Armenia’s level of social, 
economic and political development, the reactions 
and assessments in this report are more severe.
The year 2011 will mark the beginning of the third 
decade of independent statehood. This will compel 
us to examine the causes for what most indexes and 
ratings consider inadequate external economic and 
political competitiveness and insufficient internal 
social and democratic transformation.  
Successive governments have offered neither 
credible big-picture visions nor genuine short-term 
implementable solutions in response to citizens’ 
visible and understandable dissatisfaction. Nor 
have the drivers of civil society – media and non-
governmental organizations -- demonstrated the 
readiness, judjment and wisdom to ask and debate 
the profound questions.
These are some of the urgent questions to be asked:
•	 What are Armenia’s necessary security 
requirements?
•	 How to revamp Armenia’s domestic 
political system to make it healthy and 
inclusive?
•	 What should the educational system 
offer in order to nurture identity and 
also transform a small nation into a 
competitive global participant?
•	 What is the acceptable tradeoff between 
individual liberties and the collective 
good?
•	 How far is Armenian society willing to go 
to protect the most vulnerable?
•	 How to wisely and genuinely disentangle 
politics from business interests?
•	 How to introduce liberal, open, 
government supports for deep, 
sustainable, broad-reaching economic 
growth?
•	 What price is Armenia willing to pay to 
protect  the environment, for healthy, 
ecological and economic benefit?
•	 How to enable true publicly accessible 
quality health care?
•	 How to instill trust and hope in the 
justice system?   
•	 How to secure the integrity of soldiers 
as individuals and the armed forces as an 
institution?
•	 How to achieve essential Armenia-
Diaspora cooperation?
In each of the significant areas of people’s daily lives, 
what should be the policy objectives? The answer 
should be the affirmation found in the Armenian 
Constitution: to turn Armenia into a sovereign, 
democratic, social state governed by rule of law.  
Anniversaries offer the benefit of hindsight and at 
the same time, inevitably intensify expectations. 
Armenia’s 20th year to come will be no exception.
PREFACE
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This publication is intended to be 
an annual overview of the politi-
cal and economic situation in Ar-
menia, as well as those global and 
regional developments that affect 
this country and the region.
We had described 2009 as the year 
of promise and reality. It was a year 
that promised far more than it 
delivered as borne out by regional, 
domestic and political realities.
In Armenia in 2010, glaring catastrophes or evident 
achievements were absent even as the economic 
and political troubles continued to take a real toll. 
That this sort of standstill was itself an obstacle to 
economic and political progress became obvious 
given the steps that were not taken.
In 2010, the region’s internal uncertainties were 
compounded by global uncertainties vis-à-vis 
the region. Whether as a result of the US-Russia 
resetting of the previous year, or a series of choices 
forcibly or voluntarily made, the inclusion of the 
Caucasus in the Russian sphere of influence became 
more pronounced.
There was no improvement in Armenia’s relations 
with its eastern and western neighbors. When 
Armenia-Turkey protocols were frozen, so were 
official Ankara-Yerevan relations.  This ended up 
disappointing the optimists, baffling the mediators 
and vindicating the critics.
As for the Karabakh negotiation process, in 2010, it 
entered a phase of uncertainty, unpredictability and 
danger.
Internally, Armenian society saw a growing tension 
between personal freedoms taken for granted, and 
an expectation of greater civic freedoms. The result 
was a growing number of home-grown citizen 
initiatives in an otherwise politically unremarkable 
year. The middle class searched for prosperity 
and well-being in an economically and politically 
unpredictable and non-transparent environment. 
As a result, instead of middle class contentment 
nurturing a country of optimists, middle class 
discontent fed a growing legion of pessimists.
This was further aggravated by a recognition that 
institutions both in the economic and public sphere 
– from schools to police to tax collectors – appeared 
to be structurally unchanging, and therefore 
perhaps unchangeable. Both the international 
community and the country’s own citizens began to 
view this not as a very long wave of uncertainty, but 
a permanent state of capitulation.
Economically, the government utilized all available 
fiscal and monetary options to dig its way out of 
the economic crisis. It succeeded to the extent 
that it prevented financial circumstances from 
deteriorating further. But in 2010, the government 
could not or would not tackle politically sensitive 
reforms. As a consequence, the lack of diversity 
and competitiveness, as well as interdependence of 
businessmen and government officials remained the 
fundamental impediments to economic growth.
Indeed, in 2010, there were fundamental structural 
impediments to growth all around – politically, 
economically and socially. So, the year ended as it 
began – with personal and national uncertainty.
ARMENIA: A YEAR OF UNCERTAINTY
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Neither the ‘reset’ in the US-Russia 
relationship nor the policy of Zero 
Problems with Neighbors in Turkey 
transformed the environment for 
Armenia or the South Caucasus. 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia re-
mained a source of tension between 
Georgia and Russia, the Nagorno 
Karabakh resolution process did 
not move even a small step forward, 
and the Turkey-Armenia border 
remained closed. 
For Russia, 2010 meant a consolidation of its 
position in the entire former Soviet space, not just 
the South Caucasus. 
With the victory of the acceptable-to-Russia Viktor 
Yanukovych in the presidential elections in Ukraine, 
the forced resignation of Kyrgyzstan’s Kurmanbek 
Bakiyev from the presidency and his departure from 
the country, and its contemptuous posture toward 
Georgia’s Mikheil Saakashvili, Russia demonstrated 
that the Color Revolutions favored by the West had 
failed.  
In the South Caucasus, too, Russia took on a more 
confident and assertive presence. With Tbilisi, 
Russia simply took a wait-and-see approach until 
the next Georgian elections. But it was different 
with Armenia and Azerbaijan.
In Armenia, the Russian presence was accentuated 
by the Kremlin extending the presence of a Russian 
military base in Gyumri from 25 to 49 years. 
Russia had also signed 49-year basing agreements 
with Abkhazia in February and South Ossetia in 
April. In addition, the Russian role in Armenia’s 
economic and regional agenda was expanded. The 
two presidents met nine times during the year – an 
unprecedented frequency and one that left its mark, 
both practically – in the domestic sphere as well – 
and symbolically.
Azerbaijan, too, tilted ever-more northward. 
There was a dramatic increase in the volume of gas 
sales by Azerbaijan to Russia, and prospects for 
the construction of the European Union-favored 
Nabucco pipeline appeared less hopeful. 
Turkey-Russia relations improved. When Russian 
President Dmitry Medvedev visited Ankara in 
May, numerous agreements were signed, including 
the elimination of the visa regime between the two 
A REGION IN STALEMATE
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countries. Russia and Turkey have also drafted an 
intergovernmental agreement for the projected oil 
pipeline that is to cross from the northern Turkish 
city of Samsun, near the Black Sea, to the southern 
port of Çeyhan. This structure will enable Moscow 
to supply the oil pipeline with 25 million tons 
of crude oil per year, and up to three times that 
amount in the future.
In Armenia, the Russian presence was 
accentuated by the Kremlin extending 
the presence of  a Russian military 
base in Gyumri from 25 to 49 years
For Turkey, 2010 was a year that saw its 
increased engagement in the region and beyond, 
in accordance with its aspiration to the role of 
regional power.  Turkey’s return to the Near and 
Middle East, which many have described as Neo-
Ottomanism, recalling Turkey’s multicultural and 
imperial past, was heralded as an attempt to fix old 
mistakes in the region. On the one hand, Turkey 
was able to achieve a qualitatively new level of 
relations with immediate neighbors and former 
adversaries Greece, Syria, Iraq, and Iran; on the 
other hand, Turkey did not manage to straighten 
out the three main political challenges facing it – in 
Cyprus, in its own eastern and southeastern regions 
with the Kurdish population, and with Armenia.
The absence of success in these three critical areas 
undermined its policy of “Zero Problems with 
Neighbors.” Moreover, although Turkey is perceived 
most favorably in the Arab world, due to its very 
vocal and public condemnation of Israel’s treatment 
of Palestinians, Ankara’s role in the resolution of the 
most entrenched problem of the Middle East, the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, decreased significantly. 
Even as Turkey removed Armenia, Iran and Syria 
from its official list of countries viewed as threats, it 
added Israel to the list, thus further fueling the year’s 
question – Was Turkey tilting from West to East?
Despite its new assertiveness in the Middle East, 
Turkey’s pronouncements indicated that it remains 
committed to its decades-old goal of achieving full 
European Union membership. In fact, it rejected 
proposals made earlier this year by France and 
Germany for a Privileged Partnership with the EU, 
something less than full membership. Nevertheless, 
by year’s end, the repeated delays in the process had 
hit a new low. For the first time, no new negotiating 
chapters had been opened during an entire six 
month EU presidency period due to lack of progress 
on other matters.
Apprehensive and resentful at the prospect of being 
sacrificed on the “reset” altar, Georgia sought to 
further strengthen its established cooperation with 
Turkey, and to take its relations with Iran to a new 
level. 
The acute tensions in Georgian-Russian 
relations resulting from the August 2008 war, 
the subsequent formal recognition by Moscow 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent 
sovereign states, and Georgia’s severing of 
diplomatic relations in retaliation persisted 
in 2010. Georgia continued to block Russia’s 
application for membership of the World 
Trade Organization; repeatedly reaffirmed its 
determination to join NATO and the European 
Union, and its right to re-arm (despite US 
reluctance to supply the desired weaponry.) 
Further, it embarked on a new strategy of seeking to 
drive a wedge between Moscow and the population 
of the North Caucasus. The Georgian authorities 
began Internet television broadcasting in Russian to 
A REGION IN STALEMATE
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the North Caucasus with the stated aim of providing 
an alternative source of news about developments 
in the region. Georgia hosted academic conferences 
in Tbilisi on the killings and expulsions of the 
Circassians from their homeland by Tsarist Russian 
forces in 1864. Tbilisi further antagonized Moscow 
by unilaterally exempting residents of the North 
Caucasus republics from the need to acquire entry 
visas for visits to Georgia of up to 90 days. In the 
wake of that decision, Chechen Republic head 
Ramzan Kadyrov joined the chorus of Russian 
officials accusing Georgia of providing covert support 
for the North Caucasus Islamic insurgency. 
In late November, the Georgian parliament began 
preparing for an international media campaign 
arguing that Russia does not have the “moral 
right” to host the 2014 Winter Olympics so near 
the site of killings in Abkhazia – even though in 
2007 President Saakashvili hailed the Olympic 
Committee’s choice of Sochi as the venue for the 
2014 winter games.  
Saakashvili himself, as well as senior Georgian officials, 
repeatedly professed their readiness to embark at 
any time on talks without preconditions on those 
issues that constitute the fundamentals of bilateral 
relations, namely the withdrawal of Russian forces 
from Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the restoration 
of Georgia’s territorial integrity. The Kremlin ruled out 
any relations with Tbilisi so long as Mikheil Saakashvili 
is in power in Georgia. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
has, on several occasions, received members of the 
Georgian opposition in Moscow.
After remaining closed for several years because 
of “renovations,” the Georgian-Russian border 
checkpoint at Kazbegi-Upper Lars was opened mid-
year – not without mediation by Armenians, who 
after all, are as dependent on that access to Russia, as 
are the Georgians. The crossing is for freight traffic 
only. Earlier in the year, the first direct flight since 
the August 2008 War  between Moscow and Tbilisi 
was reinstated.
Turkey did not manage to straighten 
out the three main political 
challenges facing it – in Cyprus, in 
its own eastern and southeastern 
regions with the Kurdish population, 
and with Armenia
Meanwhile, tensions have arisen in Russia’s relations 
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Abkhaz 
leadership is under pressure from Moscow to 
agree to restore property belonging to persons 
who fled Abkhazia during the 1992-1993 war and 
subsequently acquired Russian citizenship; the 
Abkhaz opposition is resisting  such concessions. 
In South Ossetia, Moscow is seeking to put a stop 
to the ongoing embezzlement of billions of rubles 
Russia allocated for post-conflict reconstruction. 
Georgia’s relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey (its 
biggest trade partner, with bilateral annual trade 
totaling around $1 billion) are ruled by economic 
pragmatism, as reflected in the resumption in May 
of construction work on the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars 
rail link (suspended in December 2009) and the 
trilateral agreements signed between Georgia, 
Azerbaijan and Romania in April and September on 
the transport of Azerbaijani natural gas to Europe. 
Turkish economic presence in the Adjarian region 
of Georgia continues to grow.  
Georgia also launched an overture to Iran in May, just 
weeks after President Saakashvili felt the US snubbed 
him by not scheduling a one-on-one meeting between 
him and President Barack Obama on the sidelines 
A REGION IN STALEMATE
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of the nuclear security summit in Washington. From 
the outset, Georgian officials argued that the desire 
for closer ties with Tehran should not be construed as 
detracting from, or directed against, Georgia’s strategic 
alliance with Washington, given that the primary 
focus is economic cooperation and trade. A bilateral 
agreement was signed in November on visa-free travel, 
the opening of an Iranian consulate in Batumi, and the 
start of direct flights between Tbilisi and Tehran.  
Azerbaijan, encouraged by the freezing of the Turkish 
rapprochement process with Armenia, appeared 
increasingly to prioritize cooperation with Turkey and 
Iran over its strained relations with Washington. 
Apprehensive and resentful at the 
prospect of  being sacrificed on the 
“reset” altar, Georgia sought to 
further strengthen its established 
cooperation with Turkey, and to take 
its relations with Iran to a new level
Within days of the suspension of the protocol 
process, the Turkish prime minister and foreign 
minister publicly reaffirmed Turkey’s obligations 
under the 1921 Treaty of Kars to protect 
Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic 
from “threats” posed by Armenia. 
Turkey and Azerbaijan finally signed a long-awaited 
agreement paving the way for negotiations on the 
export via Turkey to Europe of gas from the second 
stage (provisionally scheduled for 2016-2017) of 
exploitation of Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field. 
During a visit to Baku in mid-August, Turkish 
President Abdullah Gül and Azerbaijani President 
Ilham Aliyev signed a declaration on strategic 
partnership and mutual assistance. One month later, 
Aliyev visited Ankara where he and Turkish Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan agreed on the 
formation of a Council for Strategic Partnership. 
In November, the Azerbaijani government signed 
an agreement with a Turkish company on the joint 
production of 107mm and 122mm rockets. 
However, Azerbaijan has not reciprocated the 
unilateral abolition by Ankara last year of the 
visa requirement for Azerbaijanis wishing to visit 
Turkey nor Iran’s lifting of the visa requirement for 
Azerbaijanis visiting Iran for up to two weeks. 
Azerbaijan does not technically have a strategic 
alliance with Russia, such as the one that exists 
between Russia and Armenia, nevertheless 
Azerbaijani-Russian relations continued to maximize 
the existing potential for mutually beneficial 
cooperation. Russian President Medvedev visited 
Baku in September, signing an agreement on the 
formal delimitation of the border between the two 
countries that some analysts claim is detrimental 
to their republic’s interests. Also signed during 
Medvedev’s visit was a further agreement – the third 
in one year – on purchases by Russia’s Gazprom of 
Azerbaijani natural gas. The volume of sales thus 
rose from 500 million cubic meters annually in 2009 
to one billion cubic meters in 2010 and two billion 
in 2011, with no ceiling set for further purchases. 
In addition, there have been recurring rumors, not 
denied by either side, about the sale to Azerbaijan of 
the Russian S-300 air-defense system. 
The course of Azerbaijani-Iranian relations reflects 
Washington’s dwindling influence on Baku on 
the one hand, and the potential advantages for 
Azerbaijan of capitalizing on increasingly close 
Turkish-Iranian ties, on the other. While Azerbaijan 
is bound by the UN General Assembly’s Resolution 
1929, it is apparently reluctant to compromise 
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commercial ties with Iran by complying with the 
additional sanctions on Iran imposed by the US and 
the European Union. 
Azerbaijani officials blamed Iran for flooding caused 
by problems with a dam at their border. Iran reacted 
to several incidents involving the destruction or 
near-destruction of mosques in Azerbaijan. One 
was torn down following a ruling issued by a Baku 
Economic Court. In the case of another, the State 
Oil Company of Azerbaijan said the destruction 
was necessary for technical reasons. But in May, 
Iran’s religious leadership threatened to issue a an 
appropriate fatwa if the destruction did not end. 
Iran continued to remain involved in regional 
processes, despite the international policy of 
economically isolating the Islamic Republic. 
In late November, plans were announced for a 
summit of the Iranian, Turkish and Azerbaijani 
foreign ministers in Tehran, to discuss trilateral 
cooperation, including the possible creation of 
an economic zone on the borders of Turkey, Iran 
and Nakhichevan. Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad had earlier held a trilateral meeting 
with Turkey’s Prime Minister and Brazil’s President 
Lula da Silva in Tehran.
Tehran has also been able to maintain good relations 
with its immediate neighbors, Afghanistan and Iraq, 
and has influenced internal developments there.
As for Iranian-Russian relations, it appears that 
Washington has succeeded in securing a more 
neutral Russian position towards Iran, perhaps in 
return for an acceptance of the enhanced Russian 
role in the Caucasus. Moscow went along with the 
new international sanctions and constraints against 
Iran in the summer of 2010, and at the same time 
reversed its previous decision to sell Iran several 
S-300 missile systems. But it did not do a complete 
U-turn. It did stay and complete the construction of 
Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant.  
ARMENIA – IRAN
Armenia and Iran enjoy healthy political relations. 
Although within international organizations 
Iran votes favoring Azerbaijan’s position on the 
Karabakh conflict, in the bilateral and regional 
context, Iran has succeeded in remaining 
balanced and neutral regarding both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. In turn, despite international political 
and economic pressures, Armenia has resisted steps 
which Iran would perceive as going counter to its 
national interest. Such reciprocal consideration, in 
what is otherwise an uncertain environment, has 
placed the bilateral political agenda on firm ground 
and made prospects for maintaining and growing 
economic relations possible. 
The course of  Azerbaijani-Iranian 
relations reflects Washington’s 
dwindling influence on Baku on 
the one hand, and the potential 
advantages for Azerbaijan of  
capitalizing on increasingly close 
Turkish-Iranian ties, on the other
In recent years, Iran and Armenia completed two 
significant energy projects together as part of a gas-
for-electricity deal: the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline 
was completed in 2007, and 220 kW high voltage 
electricity lines were constructed. This year, the 
energy ministers of the two countries met at the 
Hrazdan Thermal Power Station, about 50 km  (31 
miles) north of Yerevan, where they participated in 
the official groundbreaking for a third high voltage 
A REGION IN STALEMATE
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line, this one with a 400 kW capacity, to extend 275 
km (170 miles) from the power station south towards 
the Iran-Armenia border, to deliver electricity 
generated from Iranian gas.
During the same meeting, the two ministers signed 
a document on another project, long anticipated – 
construction of two hydropower stations on the Arax 
River. The agreement stipulates that the $323 million 
project will be fundamentally financed and operated 
by Iran, 793 million kWh of energy transported to 
Iran annually, and the stations transferred to Armenia’s 
ownership 15 years later. Construction is expected to 
commence in 2011 and take five years to complete.  
In recent years, Iran and Armenia 
completed two significant energy 
projects together as part of  a gas-for-
electricity deal: the Iran-Armenia 
gas pipeline was completed in 2007, 
and 220 kW high voltage electricity 
lines were constructed
Other projects on the drawing board are 
continuously delayed. Chief among them is an 
Armenia-Iran rail line, expected to stretch 313 km 
(200 miles) across several mountain ranges, and 
could cost as much as $4 billion. The dilemma 
with the construction of such infrastructure is that 
neither Iran-Armenia nor Iran-Armenia-Georgia 
freight transport would offer sufficient economic 
incentives to justify such expenditure. For that 
reason, no international entity has been willing to 
make this level of investment. The rail line would 
make economic sense if the Azerbaijan and Turkey 
blockade of Armenia were to be lifted, but in 
that case, the urgency would disappear, since the 
Yerevan-Nakhichevan-Julfa-Tabriz line would be 
usable.
Plans to build an oil refinery on the border have 
been shelved, again for economic reasons, according 
to high-level government officials on both sides. 
The other project for which there are no concrete 
plans is the oft-mentioned Iran-Armenia pipeline 
and storage terminal for refined oil, despite an 
announcement by Armenia’s Prime Minister 
Tigran Sargsyan, during a fall trip to Tehran, that 
construction would begin soon. 
Clearly, the momentum that initially existed in Iranian-
Armenian economic relations has not been sustained. 
The reasons include post-election instability in both 
countries, the disinterest of international organizations 
in a north-south energy or transportation corridor, and 
sanctions and limitations imposed on Iran. As a result, 
some programs have simply remained at the level of 
good intentions.
This is evidenced in the low volume of bilateral 
trade – $200 million, annually – which is 
approximately equal to the trade between 
Armenia and Turkey, which takes place without 
open borders, across Georgian territory. The one 
significant positive change is a noticeable increase 
in the number of Iranian tourists visiting Armenia – 
estimates are 80,000 this year.
There are occasional problems in Armenian-Iranian 
relations, such as the Iranian denunciation of the 
visit to Armenia by Nobel Prize winner, attorney 
and human rights activist Shireen Ebadi, within 
the framework of the  International Federation for 
Human Rights conference in Yerevan in April. The 
Armenian authorities, who did nothing to obstruct 
her visit, were themselves dissatisfied when she 
vocally and visibly supported the demands of the 
Armenian opposition.
A REGION IN STALEMATE
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This resulted in the postponement of a few high-
level Iran-Armenia visits. Nevertheless, during the 
year, Armenia’s prime minister, as well as the defense 
and foreign ministers, visited Tehran. Conversely, 
Iran’s foreign and energy ministers visited Armenia, 
as did the president of Iran’s Parliament.
ARMENIA-GEORGIA
Armenia and Georgia have very different, often 
conflicting, foreign policy priorities, and these 
seriously weaken bilateral relations between them. 
These differences are not always articulated nor 
addressed at high-level meetings, yet often they 
do determine the nature, depth and scope of 
Armenian-Georgian dealings. As evidence, the 
two countries do not focus on transforming their 
relations to a strategic one, or liberalizing their 
customs regime, or simplifying border crossing 
procedures, or undertaking any one of a myriad 
other possibilities to benefit from what would 
appear to be a natural alliance.
The areas of divergence that prevent such a strategic 
association are Georgia’s active pursuit of NATO 
membership, Armenia’s alliance with Russia 
with whom Georgia has no diplomatic relations, 
and Georgia’s economic and political ties with 
Azerbaijan and Turkey with whom Armenia has no 
relations. In addition, Armenia and Georgia are at 
opposite ends of the spectrum on the right of self-
determination: Georgia has two secessionist regions 
and is therefore not a supporter of the principle of 
self-determination. Armenia supports the right of 
Nagorno Karabakh to self-determination. Finally, 
Georgia’s policies regarding its Armenian minority 
are troublesome for Armenia. Yet, Armenia is 
disproportionately dependent on Georgia and 
therefore must take into account these differences, 
even as it searches for a peaceful, stable relationship.
Following the hot war with Russia, Georgia had few 
foreign policy direction options. The Russian threat, 
or Georgia’s perception of it, moved it towards 
the West. Until 2005, Russia was Georgia’s largest 
trading partner. Today, Turkey occupies that place 
with Azerbaijan coming in second at $486 million.  
Armenia and Georgia have very 
different, often conflicting, foreign 
policy priorities, and these seriously 
weaken bilateral relations between 
them 
Such economic linkages, and especially in the 
energy sector, explain Georgia’s pro-Azerbaijani 
leanings in international organizations. Add to 
that the fact that Armenia votes against Georgian 
proposed resolutions on Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. In September, at the UN General Assembly, 
Armenia along with 16 other countries, including 
Russia, voted against the right of displaced persons 
to return to their homes in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
expressed disappointment with the vote, but added 
that this should not cause a break in relations 
between Tbilisi and Yerevan.
Another potential stumbling block in Armenia-
Georgia relations is the continuing process of 
border delimitation. It is not a cause of bilateral 
problems, but a symptom of the non-urgency of the 
relationship. 
Perhaps the greatest point of tension on the 
strictly bilateral agenda is the situation of Georgia’s 
Armenian minority and their perceived treatment. 
More than 90,000 Armenians live in Tbilisi, yet the 
number of Armenian schools is steadily decreasing. 
A REGION IN STALEMATE
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Armenians claim this is an overt attempt to weaken 
ethnic identity and belonging. Georgians respond 
that Armenians increasingly send their children 
to Russian or Georgian schools, and therefore 
enrollment in Armenian schools is dropping. The 
government says the purpose is integration, the 
Armenian minority accuses the government of open 
efforts at forced assimilation.
Georgia has two secessionist regions 
and is therefore not a supporter of  
the principle of  self-determination. 
Armenia supports the right of  
Nagorno Karabakh to self-
determination 
The other expression of these same tensions is the 
status of the Armenian Church in Georgia.  In 
contrast to Armenia, where there are over 60 legally 
recognized and registered religious organizations, 
the only religious organization that enjoys legal 
recognition and the right to be registered in 
Georgia is the Georgian Orthodox Church.  The 
Armenian Church in Georgia, which has existed 
and continuously functioned there for centuries, 
may only be registered as a non-governmental 
organization, which is also true of other Christian 
churches, denominations, as well as the Jewish 
and Muslim communities.  Religious minorities 
in Georgia find this unacceptable for a number of 
reasons, among them the limited rights accorded to 
non-governmental organizations, the difference in 
status and standing before Georgian civil and judicial 
authorities, the vast differences in tax legislation 
and charitable regulations, and the basic desire to be 
treated equally and without discrimination.
In both cases, the source of the conflict is in the 
very different perceptions of history and identity. 
Georgia’s leadership is increasingly articulating its 
vision for a unitary Georgia, a nation-state, made 
up of Georgians. Armenians, who have lived in 
Tbilisi and Javakheti for centuries, believe they 
belong there, and therein lies the source of the 
strain. In addition, the Georgian government’s loud 
proclamations of Western orientation and values 
make it easy for the Armenian minority to expect 
Western treatment.
The frequent visits of high-level officials help 
ameliorate the situation. More and more, these 
visits – such as Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan’s 
in early 2010 – are not just to Tbilisi, but also to 
Batumi, on the Adjarian coast. An ever-increasing 
number of Armenian tourists also visit Batumi 
each summer – numbers exceed 100,000 – and the 
value of social and economic interaction of this 
magnitude is not lost on the Georgian establishment. 
And despite Armenia’s taking a second place to the 
Turkey-Azerbaijan tandem for Georgia, Armenia’s 
rather neutral role in the Georgia-Russia imbroglio 
has also not gone unnoticed.  
ARMENIA - TURKEY 
 
Although Turkey-Armenia trade amounted to 
approximately $200 million last year, this figure 
is not expected to increase significantly so long as 
the land border between the two countries remains 
closed. In 2010, it was confirmed that Turkey 
will keep the border closed for the foreseeable 
future after the Turkey-Armenia normalization 
process which was made very public in 2008, when 
Armenia’s president invited his Turkish counterpart 
to Yerevan to watch football together, collapsed. 
This ended up disappointing the optimists, baffling 
the mediators and vindicating the critics. 
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The speed and optimism with which the two 
sides initially moved forward were based on two 
fundamental miscalculations. The Armenian side 
believed that Turkey, which had closed the border 
with Armenia to demonstrate solidarity with 
Azerbaijan in 1993, when it had lost territories 
in the military conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, 
could somehow in fact re-open the border without 
the progress that Azerbaijan wanted to see on the 
Karabakh issue. The Turkish side, too, had made 
its own assumptions. They perhaps thought they 
could in fact push Azerbaijan to become more 
flexible, and see the benefit of open borders for the 
security environment in the region. Moreover, the 
Turkish leadership estimated that the Karabakh 
process would be moving along sufficiently quickly 
and positively so that by the time Turkey and 
Armenia had agreed on protocols, there would be 
some tangible progress on Karabakh, acceptable 
to Azerbaijan, thus freeing Turkey to open the 
border. 
The calculations were off. The protocols were 
suspended and the two sides are engaged in 
accusation and counteraccusation. The very public 
recriminations and retorts are wildly different, 
surprisingly undiplomatic, and their messages 
uncertain. 
The process came to a standstill on April 22, 2010, 
not coincidentally precisely one year after the 
announcement of a Road Map for the normalization 
of relations. The significance of these April dates were 
obvious to most and later confirmed by WikiLeaks 
cables – Turkey had aggressively used the Turkey-
Armenia protocols, particularly the prospect of their 
ratification, to pressure American leaders against 
US recognition of the Armenian Genocide, and in 
favor of a pro-Azerbaijani settlement of the Nagorno 
Karabakh conflict.
In other words, in 2009, Yerevan and Ankara 
announced an outline of a plan for the normalization 
of relations just two days before the annual 
commemoration of the Armenian Genocide precisely 
in order to offer US President Obama a reason to 
stand down from his campaign pledge to use the term 
‘genocide’ in his remarks about that day. 
The speed and optimism with which 
the two sides initially moved forward 
were based on two fundamental 
miscalculations
Almost immediately after the Road Map 
announcement, Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan 
publicly conditioned, for the first time, the Turkey-
Armenia process to progress on Karabakh. By 
October 10, 2009, when the protocols were signed 
in Zurich by the two foreign ministers, under the 
watchful eyes of the top diplomats of the US, EU, 
Russia, France, the Karabakh linkage was an open 
secret – repeatedly mentioned by Turkey and 
rejected by Armenia. In fact, the problem was so 
contentious that the Zurich signing ceremony was 
almost derailed, and there was no agreement on 
any of the participants making public statements 
after the signing, given the diametrically different 
position each was likely to take. 
Following the signing, the Armenian government 
submitted the protocols to the Constitutional Court. 
The timing was criticized – too late to influence 
the signing and too early to take into consideration 
any legislative amendments – but the Court ruled, 
nonetheless. The Constitutional Court, in taking 
into consideration the concerns and resistance made 
public, attempted to minimize the grounds for 
objections. In early 2010, the Court ruled that none 
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of the provisions of the protocols can in any way 
relate to either the historical veracity of the Genocide 
or the Karabakh conflict and its resolution.
By October 2009, when the protocols 
were signed in Zurich by the two 
foreign ministers, under the watchful 
eyes of  the top diplomats of  the US, 
EU, Russia, France, the Karabakh 
linkage was an open secret
Subsequently, President Sargsyan introduced the 
protocols to the National Assembly and assured the 
world that the Armenian parliament would ratify 
them. The Turkish foreign minister announced that 
the protocols could be ratified within three days by 
his country’s parliament but that it had not done so 
because of the unresolved Karabakh question.
Turkey, which had for the last half year, at the 
highest levels, insisted that the protocols did in fact 
have bearing over those two issues, cited the Court’s 
statement and accused Armenia of sabotage. The 
Armenian side realized that the Turks would not 
or could not open the border, and subsequently 
suspended the process in April.  
The decree came after President Sargsyan’s meetings 
with US President Obama and Turkish Prime 
Minister Erdogan in Washington, then with 
Russian President Medvedev in Moscow. The 
Armenian authorities were finally compelled to 
accept that it was no longer possible to continue 
presenting the desirable as reality.  
Those who had served as godfathers of the protocols 
process – the US, Switzerland and other European 
states – were pleased that Armenia suspended 
the process rather than end it. The Turkish side 
quickly claimed that the cessation of the process 
was Armenia’s unilateral decision and attempted to 
shape international public opinion.   
Furthermore, the Turkish side announced at various 
levels that there is ongoing, albeit quiet, diplomacy 
between Armenia and Turkey. The intent, as 
evidenced by the publication of special instructions 
issued by Ankara to its diplomatic representations, 
was to convince public opinion internationally that 
the bilateral process is not dead, and thus to put 
the brakes on the Armenian Genocide recognition 
process, yet again. As a result, in the last months of 
2010, Armenia was forced to frequently repeat that 
there is no quiet diplomacy, no Zurich Round Two, 
nor any other new process.  
Needless to say, the optimists were disappointed. 
Some had hoped that Turkey would be bold enough 
to disregard Azerbaijan’s real or perceived threats, 
confident that an open region would in the end 
benefit Azerbaijan by enabling a peace-minded, 
non-zero-sum agreement. Further, the optimists also 
clearly counted on the fact that by not including the 
terms “genocide” or “Karabakh” in the documents, 
and by merely vaguely referring to them, such 
circumvention of very divisive and difficult issues 
would somehow be possible. 
Neither worked. There was disappointment all 
around. Turkey confirmed Armenians’ worst fears 
when they later dismissed the deliberate vagueness 
that had been adopted and openly articulated their 
conditions.  
The mediators were baffled. They had gotten as far 
as Zurich, they witnessed a signing, meetings at 
the levels of presidents, and yet, the nuances they 
did not understand or wished to ignore came back 
to haunt and derail the entire process. They were 
further bewildered by the new bitterness that is 
visible at the highest levels.
A REGION IN STALEMATE
17
THE CIVILITAS FOUNDATIONARMENIA  IN  2010
But the critics were not. Those who had raised 
the alarm that the process was unfeasible and the 
documents inadequate were vindicated. Fears that 
a sloppy process would lead to failure were proven 
true. But worse, predictions that bilateral relations 
would be even more adversely affected also came 
to pass. Those who insisted that trying was better 
than not trying, or that trying couldn’t hurt, are 
now faced with a pendulum that has shifted from 
groundless elation in 2008 to unnecessary hostility 
in 2010. The sides have much to explain to their 
own publics and the international community, yet 
the messages are unclear.  As a result, the present 
discourse is limited to blame and distrust.
Finally, by suspending the protocols rather than 
completely dismissing them, the Armenian side 
has created a situation where there is no longer 
even slight pressure on Turkey to open the border. 
Instead, Turkey has now taken on the right to 
become an active negotiator in the Karabakh 
process, aggressively pushing for a resolution, in 
various forums, while clearly remaining a protector 
of Azerbaijani interests.
In the meanwhile, Turkey continues to expend 
political and financial capital on denying the 
Armenian Genocide and officially challenging or 
worse, punishing those who recognize it. In the 
spring, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US 
House of Representatives and soon after, the Swedish 
parliament, both adopted resolutions recognizing 
the Armenian Genocide. Ankara retaliated. US 
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton personally appealed 
to the Congress not to vote on House Resolution 
252. Sweden’s prime minister telephoned his Turkish 
colleague and publicly apologized. 
On the other hand, within Turkey, there were 
several first-ever occurrences in 2010. April 24 
was commemorated in a central Istanbul square, 
where scores of Armenians and Turks gathered and 
listened to both Armenian and Turkish speakers 
remember the genocide of 1915.
Armenia’s Constitutional Court, 
in taking into consideration the 
concerns and resistance made public, 
attempted to minimize the grounds 
for concern
Months later, in September, the Turkish 
government finally relented and allowed the re-
consecration of the historic tenth century Holy 
Cross Armenian Church on Akhtamar Island in the 
eastern Turkish city of Van. What had heretofore 
been beautifully restored as a ‘museum,’ could now 
serve as a house of worship for a special annual 
religious service. A liturgy was planned, but at the 
last minute, ostensibly because this was in the run-
up to local elections and the ruling party did not 
want to antagonize conservative voters, permission 
was denied to put a cross on the dome. The situation 
simply confirmed for many that the process 
was a public relations campaign by the Turkish 
government, and not a true expression of tolerance. 
An equal number protested the easy dismissal of 
what is nevertheless a useful, positive step toward 
acknowledgement of the historic Armenian 
presence in Turkey.
NAGORNO KARABAKH 
CONFLICT
If the Karabakh negotiation process in 2010 could 
be described in one sentence, it would be that it 
entered a phase of uncertainty, unpredictability 
and danger.   
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The uncertainty is due to a situation where, for 
the first time in more than half a decade, there’s no 
single document which all parties recognize as the 
text that serves as basis for negotiations.
If  the Karabakh negotiation 
process in 2010 could be described 
in one sentence, it would be that 
it entered a phase of  uncertainty, 
unpredictability and danger  
The Madrid Document had evolved over the several 
years of the Prague Process and had been deposited 
with the OSCE Secretariat in 2008, following its 
presentation by the top diplomats of the Minsk 
Group co-chair countries at the OSCE Ministerial 
Council in Madrid in 2007. The sides recognized 
the document as a basis for further negotiations, 
albeit each with its own concerns and reservations.
This document remained the negotiating document 
after Armenia’s new administration came into 
office in April 2008. It was the subject of talks 
throughout 2009, when the presidents of Armenia 
and Azerbaijan met six times under the aegis of the 
OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs. 
The presidents’ first meeting of 2010 was in Sochi, 
Russia, in January, and like the two meetings 
that followed during the year, was held with the 
mediation of the Russian President.
For this meeting, the Minsk Group co-chairs, in 
accordance with their custom, presented yet another 
revision of the former document, modified per 
prior discussions. This document, which they called 
Madrid Revised, had apparently been so one-sidedly 
altered that now it was acceptable to Azerbaijan. 
It quickly became evident from public comments 
that Armenia would not accept Madrid Revised, 
insisting that it was simply a working draft and that 
the only legitimate negotiating document remained 
the one submitted in Madrid, in 2007.  
In June, at the second meeting of the presidents in 
2010, again with President Medvedev as mediator, 
this time in Saint Petersburg, the document must 
have changed so much that it was reported that 
Azerbaijan’s president publicly abandoned Russia’s 
northern capital, in dissatisfaction. Azerbaijan 
stated that the new document was not legitimate, 
since it had been presented by the Russian side 
alone, without the presence and consent of the 
other co-chairs. Hours later, as a result of one of 
the largest military provocations since the May 
1994 ceasefire, four Armenian soldiers were killed 
when an Azerbaijani  unit succeeded in penetrating 
Karabakh’s defensive positions.
By the third meeting of the presidents, in Astrakhan 
in October, the air was full of publicly traded 
accusations and threats. On the ground, the tension 
was reflected in the unprecedented level of ceasefire 
violations and sniper fire along the line of contact. 
If in earlier periods there had been public arguments 
about specific aspects of the negotiating document, 
now the debate was not over the content of the 
document, but about which document should serve 
as a basis for future negotiations. 
In Astrakhan, the presidents did not answer this 
question but signed yet another declaration, 
reaffirming the provisions of the November 2008 
Meiendorf Declaration. In addition, they put on 
paper something they had been doing for years: to 
exchange prisoners of war and return the bodies of 
the deceased, with the assistance of the co-chairs of 
the Minsk Group and the International Committee 
of the Red Cross. There was no mention of 
Karabakh in the Astrakhan document.
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That uncertainty inevitably compounded political 
unpredictability. In the months prior to the 
OSCE Summit in Astana in early December, 
expectations were high that the presidents of the 
Minsk Group co-chair countries would meet 
with the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
Not only did such a meeting not materialize, 
but neither did a standard meeting of the two 
presidents. The fact that two presidents were in 
the same city, for the same summit, and chose not 
to use the opportunity to meet to make some, 
albeit minor, progress, is an indicator of the great 
amount of unpredictability that has become a part 
of this process. This is evidenced by the general 
absence of respect and diplomatic decorum in 
the tone and content of public statements uttered 
throughout the year by the leadership or by their 
spokesmen.
Finally, this uncertain and unpredictable phase 
in the history of the conflict has also become a 
dangerous one. The quantity and intensity of 
incidents along the line of contact are cause for 
serious alarm. According to official statistics, there 
are over 30 violations of the ceasefire daily.  
In addition, Azerbaijan has significantly increased 
its military budget. The allocations for military 
expenditures in 2011 will exceed $3 billion, and 
comprise nearly 20 percent of the state budget, 
surpassing the combined total state budgets of 
Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh. That trend will 
deepen in the coming years, Azerbaijani oil will 
not peak for another four or five years, and it is oil 
revenues that are fueling Azerbaijan’s budget, and 
perceptions of power.
Turkey’s continued involvement internationally 
is also fueling Azerbaijan’s perception of hidden 
advantage. Turkey explains its involvement in 
pursuing a resolution of the Karabakh conflict, 
because it has said overtly that only such a 
resolution will make it possible to open the border. 
The pressure is on in all quarters, including the 
UN, where Azerbaijan this year again introduced 
a resolution on “The Situation in the Occupied 
Territories.” Later, they withdrew the resolution 
in exchange for a new fact-finding mission to the 
territories surrounding Karabakh, as a follow-up to 
the one conducted five years ago.  
The Madrid Document had evolved 
over the several years of  the Prague 
Process. This document remained 
the negotiating document after 
Armenia’s new administration came 
into office in April 2008 
Yet despite such pressure and continuing 
expectations, nothing concrete came of the most 
important forum of the year, the OSCE Summit 
in Astana. The Political Declaration of the 
OSCE’s highest annual meeting usually includes 
a paragraph, agreed on by the sides and the Minsk 
Group co-chairs, that reflects the year’s progress. 
This year, there was no such language. Instead, 
there was a statement by the heads of delegations of 
the three co-chair countries, and the presidents of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
In support of the Minsk Process, there was a 
presidential statement made at the G20 Summit in 
Canada in June as well, which essentially reaffirmed 
the declaration a year earlier by the G8, at L’Aquila, 
Italy. In all three statements, France, the United 
States, and Russia reaffirmed the return of territories 
surrounding Karabakh, the granting of interim 
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status to Karabakh, a final determination of the 
status of Nagorno Karabakh via a legally binding 
expression of will by its population, the return of 
displaced persons and refugees.
If  in earlier periods there had been 
public arguments about specific 
aspects of  the negotiating document, 
now the debate was not over the 
content of  the document, but about 
which document should serve as a 
basis for future negotiations
While these discussions continued, the 
International Criminal Court in The Hague issued a 
verdict on Kosovo’s legal status, which immediately 
triggered contradictory responses. Azerbaijan 
repeated the international community’s line that 
the Kosovo situation is unique and does not apply 
to Karabakh. Armenians, on the other hand, stated 
that the Kosovo independence process proves 
that self-determination is the dominant norm in 
international relations. 
Karabakh held its fifth parliamentary elections this 
year, reinforcing its de-facto sovereignty and electing 
33 parliamentarians from three parties. Meanwhile, 
the world observed Azerbaijan’s parliamentary 
elections as well, where the president’s party again 
captured the majority of the seats.
Although visits between Armenian and Azerbaijani 
high-level officials are nearly non-existent, 2010 saw 
an unusual visit.  In April, Karekin II, the Catholicos 
of All Armenians, visited Baku for 12 hours, at 
the invitation of Sheikh ul-Islam Allahshukur 
Pashazadeh, the spiritual leader of the Muslims of 
the Caucasus.  Although the two had met previously 
a number of times in Moscow and other world 
capitals through the mediation of the Patriarch of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, this was the first time one 
of them hosted the other.  The Catholicos and the 
Grand Mufti once again confirmed the non-religious 
nature of the conflict, the necessity for the Nagorno 
Karabakh conflict to be solved only through peaceful 
means, rejected the use of force, and encouraged the 
continuation of dialogue between the parties. During 
his short stay in Baku, the Catholicos had a lengthy 
meeting with President Aliyev.
BEYOND THE REGION
Armenia’s engagement with three power centers – 
Russia, Europe and the United States – was again 
characterized by varied degrees of intensity. Russia 
retained a greater role than the other two powers. 
The year was also marked by high-level US and 
European contacts with Armenian and regional 
leaders, as well as a promise of a new level of 
integration with the European Union.
Greater assertiveness and activity by Russia resulted 
in many high-level meetings, and in some greater 
dependency on the part of Armenia on Russia. The 
same cannot be said of Armenia’s relations with the 
other two power centers. The public face of Armenian-
American relations revolved not around bilateral 
issues, but rather on the US interest in pursuing 
improved Armenia-Turkey relations. Privately, those 
relations continued as they have for nearly two decades 
in a delicate dance between support for development 
and expectations of improved democratic governance. 
Armenian-European relations, far less defined, were 
less than satisfying for both sides, with neither side 
certain of what the other expects.
In perhaps the year’s most positive development for 
the region, Russia and Georgia – after protracted 
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talks mediated in part by Armenia – agreed to re-
open the Lars border crossing that after a four-year 
closure again provides an overland connection for 
freight traffic between Armenia and Russia.
There seemed to be positive impact on Armenia-
Russia trade. Bilateral trade turnover stood at more 
than $700 million for the first nine months of 2010 
– on track to rebound to $1 billion mark first reached 
in 2008 prior to the global economic slowdown.
Throughout the year, high-level Russian-Armenian 
dialogue remained intense with Armenia’s president 
traveling to Russia eight times and Yerevan hosting 
the Russian president in August, in conjunction 
with the annual meeting of the  Collective Security 
Treaty Organization.
It was during this visit that an agreement was signed 
to extend the Russian-Armenian military treaty. 
Responding to Russia’s request, Armenia agreed to 
extend Russian military deployment in Armenia until 
2044. 
The move appeared to be part of Russia’s efforts to 
define its long-term military posture in the former 
Soviet south. In prior months, Russia achieved a 
similar extension for naval presence in Ukraine and 
it formalized its military presence in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia.
While there is believed to be public and political 
support in Armenia for Russian military presence 
– comprising some 3000 personnel and, more 
importantly, combat aircraft and modern surface-to-
air missile batteries – extension of the 1995 treaty 
was not without controversy.
Concerns focused on two areas. Whereas in the case of 
Ukraine, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia offered 
financial incentives such as reduced price for natural 
gas and economic aid, no such incentives were evident 
in Armenia’s deal, which seemed to have been rushed 
by the Russian president’s travel schedule, leaving little 
time for domestic discussions in Armenia. 
While there is believed to be public 
and political support in Armenia 
for Russian military presence – 
comprising some 3000 personnel 
and, more importantly, combat 
aircraft and modern surface-to-air 
missile batteries – extension of  
the 1995 treaty was not without 
controversy
Treaty language was altered to suggest that Russian 
forces were now to protect Armenia’s interests 
(rather than Russia’s alone) and there were renewed 
expectations of transfer of advanced military 
technology from Russia to Armenia. But questions 
remained about the pace and exact nature of such 
transfers as well as the actual role Russian forces would 
play should Armenia be the target of aggression.
Critics further noted Russia’s plans to step up 
military cooperation with Azerbaijan – the most 
likely source of aggression against Armenia – 
including reported plans to sell surface-to-air 
missile batteries that are more advanced than 
the ones deployed in Armenia, and that in 
combination with Azerbaijan’s greater aircraft 
holdings, would provide it with significant 
military advantage over Armenia in the air. This 
mid-range anti-air system has fundamentally a 
defensive significance and can significantly affect 
the balance of forces.  
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Russia had previously confirmed selling tanks and 
armored vehicles to Azerbaijan in recent years 
and Moscow may have also facilitated delivery of 
other weapons systems that Azerbaijan purchased 
from Belarus and Ukraine. These policies seem to 
run counter to Russia’s alliance commitments to 
Armenia and stated concerns over regional stability.
President Sargsyan’s visit to 
Washington was a consolation prize 
of  sorts, recognizing both Sargsyan’s 
politically controversial outreach to 
Turkey in a US-mediated process 
and failure of  that process to produce 
promised results for Armenia 
Russia’s President Medvedev continued to play a 
leading role in bringing Armenian and Azerbaijani 
presidents together three times during the year – 
within the Minsk Group framework.
Since assuming the presidency, President Sargsyan 
held his first meeting with Russia’s Prime Minister 
Putin in Moscow since June 2008.
In September, cease-fire violations on the Line of 
Contact were of sufficient concern as to be the 
subject of talks between the US defense secretary 
and the visiting Russian defense minister. Probably 
as a result, the following week at the United Nations 
in New York, in his first meeting with Azerbaijan’s 
President Aliyev, President Obama publicly called 
on Azerbaijan abide by the cease-fire.
In a year when Armenia and the United States shared 
important foreign policy goals and Armenia complied 
readily with America’s direction and encouragement 
in urging forward the Armenia-Turkey normalization 
process, Armenian-American relations should have 
been at an all-time high. Instead, they appeared to lack 
real confidence or certainty. 
In April, President Sargsyan met with President 
Obama, when the Armenian leader was invited 
to a summit on nuclear safety in Washington. 
Remarkably, this conference was the reason for the 
first visit by an Armenian president to the American 
capital in nine years. 
President Sargsyan’s visit to Washington was 
a consolation prize of sorts, recognizing both 
Sargsyan’s politically controversial outreach to 
Turkey in a US-mediated process and failure of that 
process to produce promised results for Armenia. 
Following that visit, President Sargsyan responded 
to US requests not to abandon the protocols that 
Armenia signed with Turkey in 2009 and declared 
the process of normalization suspended until 
Turkey renews its interest. 
In the meantime, President Obama adjusted his 
annual statement on the Armenian Genocide away 
from his pre-election promise for the second year in 
a row. And the Administration effectively opposed 
a congressional Genocide resolution, although it 
was passed by the House of Representatives Foreign 
Affairs Committee. 
In October, US Vice President Joe Biden said in 
videotaped off-the-cuff remarks, that President 
Sargsyan was ready to trade genocide recognition 
for relations with Turkey and was in effect to blame 
for President Obama’s position rather than Obama 
himself. That claim was quickly denied by President 
Sargsyan as well as the US Embassy in Armenia. 
With that US position, the little immediate 
impetus that Turkey had to pay heed to the process 
with Armenia appears to have dissipated, with no 
bilateral meetings reported since April.
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In July, Armenia was one of five countries that 
Secretary of State Clinton toured in as many 
days. The 24-hour visit was largely symbolic with 
Clinton visiting the Genocide memorial in what 
was announced to be a “private capacity.” It was 
also the first visit by an American secretary of state 
to Armenia since 1992. Following a meeting with 
President Sargsyan, she said she raised the issue of 
press freedoms, and welcomed the work done by civil 
society in all areas, including fair, free elections, better 
access to health care, greater flow of information, and 
trying to heal the wounds of history.
The Armenian community of the United States, 
often taking foundational credit for the bilateral 
relationship, appeared resigned to yet another US 
Administration failing to recognize the Genocide 
even when US relations with Turkey were at the 
lowest point in decades. Armenian activists did 
win a congressional allocation expanding US aid 
to Karabakh to $10 million a year. Overall, US 
programs in Karabakh amounted to more than $35 
million since 1998, but an additional $25 million in 
congressionally-allocated funds were left unspent. 
This approach reflects both Congress’s desire to 
satisfy its Armenian constituency by allocating 
funds for Karabakh and State Department’s efforts 
not to antagonize their Azerbaijani supporters by 
not spending the funds.
Politically, with the Republican victory in the 
House of Representatives, Armenians lost some key 
champions in the Congressional leadership. But 
there was also lingering hope that the new majority, 
traditionally gung-ho on foreign policy and ready to 
ignore concerns of the White House, might become 
more assertive on Armenian Genocide vis-à-vis 
Turkey, as a way of threatening it for its policies on 
Iran and Israel.
On another Genocide “front,” Armenian Americans 
launched what promises to be a protracted and 
difficult legal battle with Turkish commercial interests 
in the United States – as heirs to fortunes confiscated 
from Ottoman Armenians – with a lawsuit filed in Los 
Angeles in July. In November, a Federal Court ruling 
reversed a 2009 ruling that Genocide-era insurance 
claims in California courts are unconstitutional, paving 
the way for additional claims.
The public face of  Armenian-
American relations revolved not 
around bilateral issues, but rather 
on the US interest in pursuing 
improved Armenia-Turkey relations  
In Washington, the Armenian lobby showcased its 
muscle by blocking Matthew J. Bryza as nominee for 
US Ambassador to Azerbaijan. Bryza was criticized 
for his performance as envoy for Karabakh talks 
and his perceived close ties with the Azerbaijani 
leadership were questioned.
Armenian lobbyists also renewed efforts to promote 
a US-Armenia free trade agreement. From January-
September, bilateral trade measured approximately 
$150 million, on track for about a 30 percent 
increase over 2009. In both years, an increase in 
Armenia’s exports to the US was due to shipments 
of aluminum foil.
While in 2010, the volume of US assistance to 
Armenia remained near 2009 levels, longer-term 
decline continued. The original Millennium 
Challenge Account commitment for $235 million 
had been reduced to about $175 million due to 
Armenia’s poor governance record. Thus, the MCC 
would not complete road construction. Instead, 
the irrigated agriculture project was headed for 
completion with apparently no prospects for 
extension beyond 2011.  
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With curtailment of MCC funding, the European 
Union may thus replace the US as Armenia’s 
chief source of foreign aid for the first time since 
independence. From 2011 to 2013, the European 
Union is expected to advance at least €157.3 million 
($208 million) in aid to Armenia.
Brussels, arguably the least imposing of the three 
power centers, continues to advance European 
engagement with Armenia. In addition to 
continuing assistance programs, the European Union 
formally launched talks on Association Agreements 
with the three Caucasus states in July. Armenia says it 
continues to make its engagement with Euro-Atlantic 
organizations a priority, yet it appears hesitant in 
identifying what it is it wants from the EU, and 
especially the new Eastern Partnership. 
Politically, with the Republican 
victory in the House of  
Representatives, Armenians 
lost some key champions in the 
Democratic leadership 
The Association mechanism promises greater 
economic cooperation – via free trade agreements 
and visa facilitation – and closer political 
association short of membership. Armenia 
expects to benefit from the trade allowances while 
Europe continues to insist on standardization, 
certification, intellectual property rights and public 
procurement procedures, as well as pressing for 
economic monopolies to be dismantled in order to 
allow maximal benefit from new opportunities. It 
is uncertain how far the Armenian authorities are 
prepared to go to meet these expectations. 
Starting in April 2009, Armenia has hosted the 
EU Advisory Group, which has been described 
as a unique engagement with European advisors 
involved in various facets of the Armenian 
government’s decision-making.
The European Parliament passed Resolution 2216 
in May, within which the Parliament called for “the 
withdrawal of Armenian forces from all occupied 
territories of Azerbaijan, accompanied by deployment 
of international forces to be organized with respect 
of the UN Charter in order to provide the necessary 
security guarantees in a period of transition, which 
will ensure the security of the population of Nagorno 
Karabakh and allow displaced persons to return to 
their homes.” Immediate responses by Armenia’s top 
leadership, including the president of the National 
Assembly and the foreign minister, noted that the 
resolution’s language contradicts the European 
Parliament’s own resolutions passed since 1998, as 
well as the positions of the OSCE and the EU.  
In late December, the European Union’s Armenia 
Parliamentary Cooperation Committee concluded 
its meeting with a document that calls on Armenia’s 
leadership to take practical steps to separate business 
from politics, and to work towards bringing police 
arrest and interrogation practices in line with 
European standards.
Trade ties continued to solidify and expand. Bulgaria 
emerged as the largest importer of Armenian goods 
– $107 million between January-September 2010. As 
in years past, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium 
remained Armenia’s key trade partners.
In February, Armenia deployed a peace-keeping 
unit to serve with German forces in Afghanistan. 
Armenia also continued to participate in NATO’s 
Kosovo mission.
2010 also saw Armenian presidential visits to four 
main European capitals, with trips to London in 
February, Paris in March, Brussels in May when he 
met with the European Council President, and Berlin 
in June. 
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In his meeting with the NATO Secretary General 
in May, President Sargsyan called on the alliance to 
align its public position on the Karabakh conflict 
with that of the OSCE and stop highlighting 
territorial integrity without reference to the right to 
self-determination. 
But in November, when it became clear that 
a NATO summit communiqué would remain 
unchanged, President Sargsyan, rather than taking 
advantage of the opportunity presented by a 
summit, took the unprecedented step of canceling 
his participation. The ruling party described this 
as an “understandable boycott.” But it was unclear 
how a boycott would bring Armenians any closer 
to promoting understanding by the international 
community of Armenia’s position.
OUTLOOK
In 2011, the uncertainty will continue in East-
West relations. The US-Russia resetting will not 
lead to significant changes in the Caucasus. The 
West and Russia will continue to differ on the 
European security architecture, on South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia. Russia will continue to deepen its 
presence and influence in the Caucasus. 
The Russia-Georgia relationship will remain tense. 
Georgia will insist on the removal of Russian forces 
from Abkhazia and South Osetia on the one hand, 
while repeating its readiness to negotiate with 
Russia on the other. Moscow will continue to refuse 
to negotiate as long as Saakashvili is still president.
Russia-Azerbaijan cooperation will preserve the 
momentum of previous years especially in the 
energy sector. Moscow will attempt to conduct an 
equidistant relationship with Armenia and with 
Azerbaijan, although in its public pronouncements 
Armenia will still be called the strategic partner.
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In Russia-Turkey relations, the warming will 
continue, especialy in the energy sector. The 
Moscow-Ankara political ties will be reinforced 
if Turkey manages to keep a certain distance from 
the US and the EU, and is able to perform as a bold 
regional player.
Turkey will continue to pursue its Zero Problems 
with Neighbors Policy, however, the credibility 
and effectiveness of the policy will diminish so long 
as Ankara retains an uncompromising position 
regarding Cyprus and Armenia, and towards the 
Kurdish issue. New approaches to domestic and 
foreign policy are possible only after Turkey holds 
parliamentary elections in June, and if the AK Party 
retains its single party majority.
Progress in Armenia-Turkey relations is unlikely, 
for many reasons, including the upcoming Turkish 
elections. Turkey will continue to insist on 
linkage between the normalization of relations 
and progress in the Karabakh negotiations, at 
the same time as it tries to sustain the impression 
that the Armenia-Turkey process is still alive, in 
order to impede the already diminished drive for 
international genocide recognition. 
The Karabakh settlement process will remain 
uncertain. The sides will continue to argue not on the 
contents of a document, but on which document is on 
the negotiating table. Azerbaijan, in its bilateral and 
multilateral relations, will continue to offer rhetoric on 
a military “settlement” of the Karabakh conflict.
POLICY OPTIONS
Armenia must maintain its policy of positive 
neutrality regarding the Russia-Georgia and Iran 
and the West tensions. 
Armenia must attempt to do away with the 
uncertainties surrounding foreign policy in general, 
and the Karabakh and Armenia-Turkey issues in 
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particular. In the case of the Karabakh settlement 
process, the uncertainty pertains to the negotiating 
document. This is a serious threat for Armenians, 
and persisting disagreement over the document 
can endanger the existence of the concept of self-
determination in the negotiations and in any new 
negotiating document.
Armenia must not respond to Azerbaijan’s military 
threats with a reciprocal “threat” of its de jure 
recognition of Nagorno Karabakh. The de-jure 
recognition of Nagorno Karabakh by Armenia must 
not be a counter step, rather a conceptual anchor 
and outcome. 
As Baku relentlessly preaches its version of 
Karabakh’s right to self-determination, that is, 
within Azerbaijan’s borders, Armenia must make 
clear Karabakh’s self-determination attributes for 
the international community.
Notwithstanding the Azerbaijani president’s 
admonition to his country’s non-governmental 
organizations to not visit Armenia or Karabakh, 
Armenia should encourage contact between 
journalists, NGOs, artists and other professionals 
from Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Uncertainty must be removed from Armenia-Turkey 
relations. This “frozen” status, with the border closed, 
gives Armenia nothing, while it allows Turkey 
to exploit the situation unilaterally both on the 
Karabakh conflict and on Genocide recognition.    
Given little chance that Turkey will remove the 
blockade of Armenia or that Azerbaijan-Armenia 
transportation routes will be opened, Armenia must 
deepen bilateral ties with its two other neighbors 
– Georgia and Iran. Taking into consideration the 
recent closeness between the two, Armenia must 
endeavor to become the land link connecting the 
northern and southern neighbors.   
Euro-integration is one of the few unifying foreign 
policy directions for Armenia and Georgia. As 
cooperation intensifies with the European Union, 
Armenia and Georgia must work together. Armenia 
and Georgia, with their similar rankings in 
democratization, economic liberalization and value 
systems, are more attractive together as a market, for 
Europe. 
China and India’s presence is increasingly felt in 
the South Caucasus. Armenia must expend special 
effort to reach new levels of bilateral cooperation 
with China, the world’s second largest economy. 
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The political year 2010 ended as it 
began – by reinforcing the status 
quo in domestic life, and substan-
tially diminishing expectations of 
change in society. No substantial 
steps were taken to tackle the causes 
and consequences of the deep 
public political crisis exacerbated 
by the 2008 presidential election. 
Nor were there efforts to lessen the 
effects of the crisis by introducing 
genuine liberalizing reforms. Thus 
the past remained murky, the pres-
ent and future uncertain. 
The already growing gap between the elites and 
the population grew a bit wider – not simply 
economically but politically. The majority of the 
public, disconnected from political processes, 
observed the workings of the state services and 
concluded that the ruling party’s hold on the 
various institutions of society – education, taxation, 
police, media – had become even more unyielding.  
The political and economic elites or those closest 
to power and most affected by them, became 
increasingly disheartened and pessimistic about the 
ability of the ruling party and leaders to maintain 
order, give direction and ensure some predictability 
and certainty in economic and political processes. 
Internal processes were affected by regional 
developments and the continuing economic 
crisis. Domestic political forces were reconfigured 
sufficiently to raise the specter of a new sort of 
uncertaintly. 
The Armenian Revolutionary Federation, which had 
formally left the coalition the previous year because 
of the president’s insistence on pushing forward the 
Armenia-Turkey protocols, did not transform their 
agenda or activities in any significant way. Their 
political ambitions remained unclear.
The other coalition party, Prosperous Armenia, also 
took steps to signal its readiness to compete with 
the ruling Republican Party. 
Finally, the Armenian National Congress (ANC), 
carrying the banner of the opposition, itself 
prevaricated in its statements and activities in ways 
that rendered vague its own positions and potential. 
Thus, both the political and economic GINI 
coefficients grew even as political and economic 
processes progressed in unpredictable and uncertain 
ways. The first notable political event of the year 
was the special election held in the electoral 
district whose representative in Parliament, one of 
independent Armenia’s first major businessmen 
and one of the first to enter politics, Khachatur 
Sukiasyan, laid down his mandate and left the 
country. He did so after spending some time in 
hiding following charges brought against him in 
the aftermath of the 2008 election, in the context 
of his close affiliation with former president and 
unsuccessful presidential candidate Levon Ter 
Petrossian.  His parliamentary seat was sought by 
another opposition leader, Nikol Pashinyan, editor 
of the daily newspaper Haykakan Zhamanak, who 
was himself being held in detention on charges of 
organizing mass disorder. 
In the midst of formal and informal charges of 
impropriety by the Armenian National Congress, 
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the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, and 
others, the winner was a heretofore little-known 
member of the National Unity Party. Also 
remarkable was the fact that voter turnout did not 
exceed 20 percent, in a district whose residents 
are considered knowledgeable and politically 
savvy. Thus, this low figure, even in the Center 
District of Yerevan where voters had a chance to 
elect an arrested member of the opposition to the 
National Assembly, either was simply typical for a 
special election, or reflected the population’s deep 
disenchantment.
The already growing gap between the 
elites and the population grew a bit 
wider – not simply economically but 
politically
Nine days after the election, Pashinyan’s guilty 
verdict was issued and he was sentenced to serve 
seven years. This was subsequently cut in half. 
He remained in prison, but continued to be a 
significant political player with his editorials, which 
appeared daily until the end of the year, savaging the 
authorities and sanctifying the Ter-Petrossian-led 
opposition.
There were other changes, too, in Parliament. No 
longer did the Parliament’s Council of Europe 
delegation include the vocal member of the 
opposition Heritage Party, Zaruhi Postanjyan, who 
consistently raised Armenia’s domestic challenges in 
Strasbourg. Officials explained that the coalition’s 
Rule of Law Party representative replaced the 
former coalition member ARF. The ARF, in turn, 
with more parliamentarians than the Heritage 
Party, and now a non-coalition member, became the 
“opposition” in the delegation. 
But the Council of Europe’s engagement was 
not as profound as in past years. In March, the 
monitors requested that the government provide 
them with a timetable for reforms. The opposition 
Armenian National Congress responded before the 
government did. This received no rejoinder from 
either the authorities or the Europeans. There was 
no public debate, nor was there one later, when the 
ANC presented a 100-Step Economy program, 
presented to the European ambassadors, as well as 
the public. The ANC did not pursue discussions 
on the specifics of either its economic or political 
proposals.  
The Armenian National Congress was consistent 
and successful in using the presence in Yerevan of 
European policy and opinion makers to publicly 
express its dissatisfaction and its demands. One such 
event, in October, was the Future of Democracy 
Forum of the Council of Europe, this year held 
in Yerevan. Prior to that, in early April, an ANC 
demonstration was made to coincide with the 
annual conference of the respected International 
Federation for Human Rights, held in Yerevan. 
Conference participants, including well-known 
human rights defenders from various countries, 
actually joined the demonstrators who were calling 
for the release of imprisoned political activists.
The conference was held in the Philharmonic Hall, 
in Opera Square, although the square itself, the 
site of the post-election sit-in in February 2008, 
remained unavailable for public meetings. The 
opposition staged its protest at the Matenadaran 
while the area around the opera continued to be 
used for various entertainment purposes. 
The year 2010 was one of uncertainty and internal 
challenges for the ANC, which at its irregular 
public demonstrations announced time-outs 
coupled with an expectancy for transformative 
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events. In the absence of a role in the National 
Assembly, and without the opportunity for 
substantial input in domestic politics, the ANC 
began to experience internal problems, natural to 
such a situation. The history-making Armenian 
National Movement (ANM) which led the 
Karabakh and environmental movements in the late 
1980s and subsequently was independent Armenia’s 
home-grown political force, is the party at the 
core of the ANC. But in 2010, the president and 
vice-president of the ANM resigned, amid charges 
by internal opponents, that the two officers were in 
collusion with the authorities.   
The ensuing elections for a new president were 
followed by charges of election manipulation. 
The accusation was made by Karapet Rubinyan, 
a prominent ANM member and former Deputy 
Speaker of the National Assembly. He resigned after 
explaining that the ANC has been transformed 
into a locomotive for one man, its leader, former 
President Ter Petrossian, and that there was no longer 
room for a plurality of opinions.  Subsequently, 
another prominent ANM member and former 
foreign minister Alexander Arzoumanian also voiced 
concerns about the absence of liberalism in the party 
and in the country generally.
Although these discussions went no further and had 
no public consequence, the public’s perception of a 
solid opposition was weakened.  
The coalition’s status, too, appeared vague, following 
some moves by the Prosperous Armenia Party. In 
the fall, the party held on to its portfolios in the 
cabinet but made new appointments. The deputy 
speaker of the National Assembly was removed 
and another installed, within the party’s mandate. 
Neither the coalition nor the government bothered 
to interpret such moves. Everyone assumed the 
changes were internal party matters. 
The pro-government Rule of Law party made 
similar changes. But it was the Prosperous Armenia 
Party’s changes, both cosmetic and substantial, 
that transformed the perception of the group and 
its leader, businessman-parliamentarian Gagik 
Tsarukian, and their relationship with their partner, 
the ruling Republican Party.
The Prosperous Party took on the veneer of a real 
player, with frequent press appearances in the 
company of visiting foreign dignitaries as well as a 
variety of local constituencies.  
Domestic political forces were 
reconfigured sufficiently to raise the 
specter of  a new sort of  uncertaintly
As the Prosperous Armenia Party worked to 
reinforce its independent image publicly, the party’s 
leader and others freely exchanged words with the 
Republican Party, including a charge by Tsarukian 
of the incompetence of the Minister of Economy. 
Although the minister was removed from his post 
at the end of the year, the Republicans rejected 
Tsarukian’s criticism. 
When a similar critical comment was made by 
former President Robert Kocharian, whose public 
political pronouncements were rare, rumors flew 
wild about a possible tandem between the two 
enabling Kocharian’s return to politics.  
ARF members echoed these economic critiques, but 
their focus was on the Turkey-Armenia protocols. 
In the period of debate over the desirability of 
the Turkey-Armenia protocols, a dozen different 
organizations formed a citizen initiative with the 
ARF, under the NO banner. When the protocols 
were frozen in April, the public NO campaign died.
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The borders remained closed, the prospects for 
improved relations remained foggy, and the anti-
protocol forces found no other theme around which 
to rally their resources. Thus the hope of some, that 
the government’s foreign policy failure would be 
transformed to a domestic issue, died. Ironically, 
the country’s leadership, the same proponents of 
the protocols who a year earlier were predicting 
imminent improvement of Armenia-Turkey 
relations and open borders, now, in 2010, created 
their own official version of a NO Campaign, by 
mounting an anti-Turkey crusade. 
Thus, both the political and economic 
GINI coefficients grew even as 
political and economic processes 
progressed in unpredictable and 
uncertain ways
Despite lack of success in foreign policy and in 
certain economic sectors, at year’s end, the ruling 
Republican Party of Armenia initiated certain 
unexpected reshuffling and consolidating of 
positions and image.
The rearranging began when the President accepted 
the resignation of Yerevan’s mayor Gagik Beglaryan 
over a violent incident between the mayor’s 
entourage and one of the president’s protocol team. 
Initially, this seemed like a personal settling of 
accounts coupled with an effort by the president 
to establish a better public image, and perhaps rein 
in the excesses of the political and economic elite. 
Karen Karapetyan, president of ArmRusGasard, 
one of the largest Armenian companies and the 
single gas distributor, was elected mayor by the City 
Council. In the meanwhile, Gevorg Danielyan, 
minister of justice, was removed for not having 
complied with a directive of the prime minister and 
replaced by Hrair Tovmasyan, a young attorney, 
former member of the Armenian Democratic Party 
and experienced with international organizations.  
There were resignations and new appointments 
throughout the economic team. The Minister 
of Economy, Nerses Yeritsyan who had only 
recently become a card-carrying Republican, and 
was considered a favorite of the international 
community but not of local businessmen, was 
replaced. Minister of Finance Tigran Davtyan, 
once deputy minister of economy, was appointed 
minister. The finance ministry’s top post went to 
Vatche Gabrielyan, who like Yeritsyan came out of 
the Central Bank.  All three are seen as being part 
of Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan’s team. These 
tactical steps are seen as moves by the president to 
positively impact public opinion.
Armenia’s international ratings in 2010 were not 
encouraging. Freedom House, the international 
human rights and advocacy organization, judged 
Armenia to be ‘somewhat free’ for the second 
year in a row. Armenia received a six, which is 
only one place away from the ‘not free’ category. 
Transparency International, the anti-corruption 
organization, indicated that Armenia rates 120 
out of 180 countries in perceptions of corruption. 
The Economist Intelligence Unit gave Armenia 
four points more than last year, which still places 
it at 109 among 167 countries, when neighbor 
Azerbaijan is at 137 and Georgia at 104.
In 2010, the phenomenon of practical and effective 
citizen initiatives was significant. Although they 
remained at the level of public calls for action, 
rather than strategized plans of action, they 
succeeded in rallying support from a variety of 
geographic and demographic constituencies. There 
were several in particular that gained popularity. 
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“We Are the City” aimed to raise awareness of 
the need to protect the city’s parks from further 
development. The other campaign, “We Oppose 
Foreign Language Schools” attempted to pre-
empt the government attempt to amend the law 
on language, and pass new legislation allowing 
public school instruction to take place exclusively 
in a foreign language. By year’s end the Law on 
Language was indeed changed opening the way for 
the controversial changes in the education law.
Another movement embraced the open-air 
amphitheater adjacent to the Moscow Theater and 
called for preventing its destruction. That appeared 
to have been successful.
Throughout the year, environmentalists were active 
in calling attention to the need to protect the Teghut 
Forest in the northern Lori region. In addition a new 
campaign took off when it became clear that there 
will be renewed uranium mining in Syunik.
In the fall, there was a huge outcry against a 
revision of the law on maternity leave, which 
cut the maternity payment allowances to levels 
lower than most professional working women’s 
salaries. Nevertheless, after the law was passed 
the governmnet said it would ask the National 
Assembly for a review.
Cases of abuse and violence against women and 
children also drew public attention, both in and 
outside Armenia. The death of a young mother at 
the hands of family members raised concern about 
the weakness of domestic violence legislation. 
The abuse of children at a residential special 
education facility raised voices about the inefficient 
implementation of legislation. 
The struggle between the community of non-
governmental organizations and the Armenian 
government had its ups and downs. Various 
meetings and protests by the organizations resulted 
in preventing the passage of legislation in the 
National Assembly. On the other hand, the Justice 
Ministry used the power of the administrative 
decision, mid-year, to unilaterally create an oversight 
body to monitor the fiscal and administrative 
activities and fiscal reporting in the sector. The 
agency has not actually conducted any work.
The Armenian National Congress 
was consistent and successful in using 
the presence in Yerevan of  European 
policy and opinion makers to 
publicly express its dissatisfaction 
and its demands
The situation in the Police Department remained 
worrisome. In April, a young man died while under 
police custody in the city of Charentsavan. The 
immediate official explanation was suicide, although 
it’s been heavily tested in court with evidence of 
violence. The proceedings are continuing and all 
suspicions lie with those in law enforcement. 
In the absence of political access and responsiveness, 
there was some hope that citizen initiatives might 
become the instruments by which citizens can express 
their opinions. For this to succeed, the Armenian 
media must be transformed. Yet, in 2010, they 
remained hamstrung by a lack of political freedom, 
financial independence and objectivity that translates 
into inadequate news reporting and analysis. 
Armenia continues to fare rather poorly in global 
press freedom rankings. In 2010, Reporters Sans 
Frontières, an international media watchdog, 
ranked Armenia 101st out of 178 countries that 
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were surveyed in the latest Press Freedom Index 
published. Still, that was an improvement over the 
Paris-based group’s 2009 index that put Armenia in 
111th place. Decreased violence against journalists 
appears to have been instrumental in the country’s 
improved rating.
The March 2010 passage by the National Assembly 
of amendments to a number of media-related laws 
included the decriminalization of libel offenses. But 
others toughened financial sanctions for defamation 
of character. Media watchdogs expressed concern 
that this could make it easier for authorities to 
muzzle independent or pro-opposition outlets. 
In the absence of  political access and 
responsiveness, there was some hope 
that citizen initiatives might become 
the instruments by which citizens can 
express their opinions
The Armenian government faced strong domestic 
and international criticism as it pushed through the 
National Assembly in May a set of amendments to 
a law on television and radio that were meant to 
regulate local broadcasters’ mandatory transition to 
digital broadcasting by July 2013. Armenia’s leading 
media associations believe that the real purpose of 
these changes is to enable the authorities to retain 
their strong influence on the broadcast media’s news 
coverage by decreasing the number of outlets.
These concerns were echoed by the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe and its 
Representative on Media Freedom in particular. 
They submitted to the Armenian authorities specific 
recommendations which would eliminate “undue 
limitations on freedom of the media” envisaged 
by the government bill. The government claimed 
to have accepted most of these recommendations 
before having the parliament pass the bill in June. The 
OSCE Media Representative insisted, however, that 
the proposals “of crucial importance” were ignored. 
The OSCE, as well as the European Union and 
the United States, urged the authorities to make 
further changes in the bill. President Serzh Sargsyan 
reportedly pledged to do so during his July 4 
meeting with the visiting US Secretary of State. 
Sargsyan subsequently tasked Armenia’s Human 
Rights Defender to form a working group of state 
officials and media experts to draft such changes. 
Nevertheless, the tender announced and 
implemented by the National Commission on 
Television and Radio was held in late December. 
Only two frequences had more than one bidder. 
In one of them, A1+, Armenia’s independent 
broadcaster controversially taken off the air in 2002, 
was vying for a broadcasting frequency currently 
held by the ArmNews TV channel. A1+ lost again, 
as did the populist, unpredictable ALM channel.
The amended law on broadcasting also called into 
question the continued existence of GALA TV, 
another, functioning independent station based in 
Gyumri. It stipulates that there can be no more than 
one TV channel in each of Armenia’s ten provinces 
outside Yerevan after 2015. There are presently 
four such channels operating in Gyumri and the 
surrounding Shirak province. All of them except 
GALA are loyal to the government. GALA indeed lost 
the tender and is scheduled to lose its license in 2015.
While retaining their tight grip on the airwaves, 
the authorities have remained largely tolerant of 
print and online media not controlled by them. 
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Major Armenian newspapers continue to be highly 
critical of the government, dismissing nearly all 
government statements or initiatives. The country’s 
two best-selling dailies, are aligned with the 
radical opposition. In total, their distribution is 
10,000. Just how profitable or self-sufficient these 
publications are remains unclear. 
The press is facing growing competition from a 
multitude of internet publications providing faster 
and less opinionated news coverage. There are 
presently more than two dozen online news agencies 
and other publications reporting from Armenia on 
a daily basis. At least three of them were launched in 
2010. The most popular of the sites receive more hits 
per day than the most widely read newspapers. 
While advertisements in printed publications has 
seen a significant decrease in the last two years, the 
amount of advertisements appearing on internet 
news sites appears to have grown, some say as much 
as 20 percent this year.    
Some of the internet news outlets have this year 
added video content, making them potential rivals 
of TV stations where programming continues to be 
dominated by entertainment programs, local and 
foreign soap operas and foreign films. Television 
news programming remains mostly pro-government 
or innocuous.
In 2010, a government-approved national 
education plan for 2011-2015, as well as several 
institutional changes aimed at making the education 
system more responsive, had at their basis the same 
two rights and expectations: equal opportunity 
and access to education, improving the quality of 
education and efficient management. 
This plan that, according to the law, is the 
expression of Armenian government policy on 
education, contains no policy on foreign language 
instruction. Yet, that was the most hotly-contested 
topic of the year.  
The Armenian government faced 
strong domestic and international 
criticism as it pushed through the 
National Assembly in May a 
set of  amendments to a law on 
television and radio that were 
meant to regulate local broadcasters’ 
mandatory transition to digital 
broadcasting by July 2013 
A poorly conceived and even more poorly presented 
law whose purpose seemed to be to modify the 
legislation in order to allow instruction in a language 
other than Armenian first seized the public’s 
attention in March when it entered the National 
Assembly. This led to months of bitter protest and 
extreme discussions about identity and education. 
The draft was pulled in favor of another where 
changes were made in the education legislation, 
not on the Law on Language. In December, despite 
protests, the Law on Language was amended, without 
addressing the following issues:
•	 Does Armenia have a national policy on 
foreign languages in public education? 
What derailed the 2007 draft legislation 
which had been prepared by the Ministry 
of Education and Science, did not pass 
and has been generally forgotten?
•	 What do other small countries with 
unique languages do in similar situations? 
•	 Can the issue be discussed as two separate 
questions – how to teach and strengthen 
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a nation’s mother tongue and a people’s 
identity, and how to teach and foster 
the learning of foreign languages in 
order to ensure global integration and 
competitiveness?
In 2010, structural changes continued at three 
different educational levels.
Re-introducing broadly accessible pre-school 
education and ensuring its accessibility to all is still a 
serious educational concern. Of the country’s nearly 
1000 villages and communities, more than 400 
don’t have pre-schools. And the rate of attendance 
of pre-schools is 29.8 nationwide, according to 2008 
figures. 
Rights and expectations: Equal 
opportunity and access to education, 
improving the quality of  education 
and efficient management 
Towards that end, in two marzes – Ararat and 
Aragatsotn, both agriculturally productive regions, 
adjacent to Yerevan, 41 pre-school centers were 
opened this year, each capable of offering services 
lasting one month to one year. A particular focus of 
these centers is to increase access for the children of 
economically disadvantaged families.  
In 2010, 91 senior high schools opened in Armenia, 
31 of them in Yerevan. This, in order to correspond 
to international standards, by adding 11th and 
12th grades to the student’s school years. The goal 
is to have 300 good quality senior high schools 
throughout the country. Therefore renovation, 
refurbishing, curriculum and textbook issues must 
be resolved. The same questions of accessibility 
affect senior high schools as well.  
At the higher education level, questions about the 
quality and relevance of education from a private 
institution of higher learning resulted in seven such 
private colleges losing their licenses completely, and 
six others, only for certain departments. This was 
done at least in part to assure competitiveness.
Besides the institutional challenges, corruption in 
the education system remained a serious problem.
There were more than four dozen incidents of 
selling diplomas and grades. A very few were 
punished. 
But the struggle against corruption was also of 
the moral kind. Much of the year, the ‘odyssey’ 
surrounding the child abuse charges levelled 
against a teacher in a Special Education school 
grabbed the public’s attention. After some efforts 
to blame the whistle-blowers for creating or 
exaggerating the problem, judicial proceedings 
were brought against the teacher and he was 
sentenced to two, then three years, in response to 
a public outcry. The principal was fired, but no 
charges were levelled against him.
In the army this year, although the number of 
violent incidents and deaths was lower than in years 
past, the public debate about the army and the 
treatment of soldiers was possibly the top news and 
discussion topic of the year.
In June, four soldiers died as a result of Azerbaijani 
incursion into Karabakh’s defensive positions.
Just one month later, a soldier opened fire, killed five 
of his fellow soldiers and then himself.  Two months 
later, four more soldiers died. During the year, 
there was both official and non-official information 
about other such incidents. In November, four 
soldiers died and four were wounded on the Line of 
Contact.
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The amount of information about corruption, 
violence and deaths, as well as information about 
incidents of brutality – among soldiers, and 
between commanders and soldiers – overtook 
the media and social media. The response of the 
Defense Ministry was surprising. The Minister and 
several top officers met with the families of victims, 
and publicly chastised and removed from command 
several responsible officers. 
The general public consensus seemed to be that the 
near 50 incidents are significant not because this  
number is higher than in years passed, but because 
the public is now more informed about such 
tragedies. 
These incidents raised a multitude of questions: What 
are the fundamental causes of these violent incidents?
What is the social, educational and command 
structure in the armed forces that allows for such 
tragedies to take place without preventive measure 
built in the system?
To what extent are these problems the result of the 
conditions of the army, and to what extent are they 
an extension of social and moral problems within 
society?
Are conditions in the armed forces egalitarian? 
Are all layers of society represented in the army? 
Or is there a distinction between the elite (the 
commanders and officers) and the unprotected 
layers of society (the soldiers)?
The absence of trust regarding army life remains a 
serious problem. Evidence was offered by a recent 
Caucasus Research and Resource Center poll 
that demonstrated that a mere 20 percent of the 
Armenian public trusts that there is no corruption 
in the Armenian army. Another 42 percent believes 
there is corruption, of some kind, in the army. 
These questions were asked in the media, and 
answers were provided by the Defense ministry 
as well as their newly established Public Council, 
manned by a former soldier. The Defense Ministry’s 
new spokesperson presented a more open 
communication system.
The amount of  information about 
corruption, violence, and deaths, as 
well as information about incidents 
of  brutality – among soldiers, and 
between commanders and soldiers – 
overtook the media and social media
Given the increased urgency created by regular 
Azerbaijani encroachments, and the limited 
educational, social and economic services and 
protections offered soldiers, the situation promises 
to remain tense.  
Finally, structural reforms mean that the army will 
consist of not just draftees and career officers, but 
also professional soldiers, although there is no way 
the last two will suffice and replace the need for a 
draft, especially so long as the Karabakh conflict 
remains unresolved.
In addition to the internal issues of Armenia’s 
armed forces, the army continued to undergo 
a process of increasing civilian control, per 
Armenia’s IPAP with NATO. Armenia’s Kosovo 
and Afghanistan contingents continued to serve 
with allied forces.
Arms production in Armenia has increased. There 
are 2000 different types of arms being locally 
produced – from uniforms to radio and optical 
instruments, munitions and other supplies.
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OUTLOOK
2011 will be considered a pre-election year, even 
though the May 2012 parliamentary elections 
are 18 months off. This expectant environment 
will exacerbate tensions between the government 
and the opposition. All parties, in and out of the 
coalition, will begin to position themselves for the 
elections. On the one hand, this will compound 
the uncertainty; on the other, if some political 
forces take bold and creative steps to create more 
acceptable and sensible political unions, then there 
may be new hope for a responsive system.  
The two major parties – the Republican Party 
and the Prosperous Armenia party – will compete 
against each other. Such competition is also possible 
within the Republican Party itself for top positions 
on the party slate.
The opposition too will experience internal clashes. 
Although the ANC continues to claim that it is the 
only credible and leading opposition, neither the ARF 
nor the Heritage Party will sit idly by. The authorities 
will attempt to revive the marginal opposition.
In the absence of any significant reconfigurations, 
the reigning apathy will persist and together with 
the effects of the economic crisis, can aggravate the 
wave of emigration already on the increase. 
Those television stations which have licenses for 
digital broadcast will on the one hand feel more 
secure; on the other hand, the government, given 
the pre-election worries, will continue to leverage its 
authority to manage content.
Although domestic reconfigurations will be the 
center of attention during the year, nevertheless 
foreign policy developments, as well as incidents 
on the Karabakh-Azerbaijan Line of Contact will 
seriously affect domestic developments.
Questions and debates on the safety, predictability 
and desirability of army service will persist, yet the 
Defense Ministry’s open engagement will quicken 
structural changes.
POLICY OPTIONS
The leadership of the existing political forces must 
recognize that the political field requires such 
reconfiguration as to make possible the removal of 
the extant political monopolies and the creation of a 
healthier balanced political environment that offers 
choice. 
Citizen initiatives can become useful instruments 
of reform if public institutions recognize the 
need for public involvement and the citizenry can 
conceptualize and define their demands specifically 
and practically.
The government will need the support of the public 
to meet external challenges. For that purpose the 
role of society must be strengthened and respected.
The policy of the government regarding education 
must be aimed at improving the quality of 
education in all its aspects, by benefitting from the 
totality of the European integration processes. At 
all levels, a transparent qualifications network is 
required for all private educational institutions.  
Without financial and political independence, it 
will be difficult for either television or newspapers 
to reflect objectively on the country’s problems. 
Nevertheless, in a pre-election environment, 
the press must become more comprehensive – 
providing space for problem topics as well as 
those holding differing opinions. Otherwise party 
politics and personalized issues will dominate the 
traditional outlets and further reduce the public’s 
interest and trust.
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If in 2009, the international 
economic flurry focused, on the 
one hand, on rescuing the global 
economy and recovering from the 
crisis, and on the other hand, 
determining a judicious strategy 
and timing for an exit from depen-
dencies on new growth drivers, 
then 2010 was the year that saw a 
winding down of stimulus pack-
ages, quantitative easing and tax 
credits. 
In their wake, these interventions 
left behind enormous debt and 
deficit. The imperative for austerity 
measures followed. Major western 
economies, such as Germany and 
the UK, and Greece and Ireland, 
some grudgingly, some forcibly, 
adopted severe, strict budgets. The 
debate then spread to the wisdom 
of the timing of these measures, 
given the enduring fragility of the 
world economy.   
Those countries that still feel the need to stimulate 
their economies have resorted to monetary policy. 
The initial fiscal stimuli which were heavily used 
during the height of the crisis were intended to slow 
the decline and mitigate its consequences. Later, 
governments  injected money into their economies 
to continue to stimulate growth through quantitative 
easing, and particularly, purchasing of bonds.
Although this was the case for most, Armenia was 
among the exceptions. Armenia’s stimulus did not 
yield the anticipated results. The Anti-Crisis Action 
Plan, intended to minimize decline and prepare the 
ground for post-crisis recovery, was not effective. In 
addition, long-term consequences of the short-term 
fixes are profound. 
There are the reasons why Armenia’s Anti-Crisis 
Action Plan did not have the intended effect in 2010:
•	 The government’s program was not 
accompanied by structural reforms. The 
economy is not diversified, there is deep 
monopolization, close interdependencies 
persist between business and government, 
and a continuing absence of good 
governance. 
•	 Competitiveness was neither 
mandated nor enabled. Armenia 
placed 98 out of 139 countries in 
2010, in the World Economic Forum 
Global Competitiveness Report, 
outperforming only Tajikistan and 
the Kyrgyz Republic among the CIS 
and Eastern European countries. 
Although Armenia rates high in the 
ease of registering a business, but in 
doing business, Armenia is ranked 93 in 
protecting investors and 153 in ease of 
paying taxes, out of 183 countries. 
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•	 The government program’s tax 
component was not commensurate to the 
task of stimulating the economy. Despite 
a sizable VAT deferral program aimed 
at helping business, the government 
became both assertive and selective in 
tax collection, motivated as it was by 
high borrowing and high expenditures. 
The burden fell disproportionately on 
small and medium size enterprises, which 
particularly during a crisis period are 
expected to be the engines of economic 
growth.
•	 The value of the Armenian Dram (AMD) 
was artificially kept high during the 
height of the crisis. If the AMD had 
been allowed to depreciate to its market 
level, exports would have become more 
competitive and the purchasing power 
of those dependent on remittances from 
abroad would have increased. Instead, out 
of a fear of inflation and concern about 
alienating the powerful importers of oil, 
sugar, flour, cigarettes and beverages, the 
AMD was kept high.
•	 None of the big item ventures in the 
government program turned into actual 
projects. The construction of a nuclear 
power plant remained distant, as did the 
north-south highway. The rail line from 
Iran was not even a topic of conversation, 
and the Armenian Development Bank 
was remembered at year’s end, with the 
appointment of a chairman.
•	 The cost of borrowing for local investors 
remained exuberantly high (above 20 
percent) and dampened interest in 
possible investments.Armenia’s hastily-
devised stimulus effort not only did not 
minimize the effect and local impact of 
the global economic crisis but created 
a whole new macroeconomic reality 
making future growth much more 
challenging. During the year, Armenia 
faced and continues to be daunted by 
these serious structural and fundamental 
challenges:
•	 Low diversity, low competitiveness, and 
high monopolization
•	 Limited external borrowing capacity
•	 Unsustainable budget deficit
•	 High inflation
•	 Crippling external trade deficit.
Therefore in 2010, the government’s main policy 
direction was to address these post crisis challenges. 
The government modified its economic program to 
focus on the following vulnerabilities through what 
it called public-private partnershps:
•	 growth and poverty reduction 
•	 fiscal and debt sustainability
•	 large external imbalance
•	 financial stability
•	 competitiveness and good governance.
During the year, the government was faced with the 
dilemma of balancing between the government’s 
big item infrastructure expenditures and social 
programs on the one hand, and its commitment to 
fiscal and financial responsibility on the other. 
On the fiscal front, the government pursued the 
following:
•	 Reducing the budget deficit from the 
high 7.5 percent of GDP to 4.8 percent
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•	 Increasing tax revenues to GDP radio 
by ½ percent through improved tax 
collection
•	 Reintroducing the mid-term expenditure 
framework to reduced public debt and 
shift spending towards social programs 
and investments
•	 Keeping the public (and publicly 
guaranteed) debt at 50 percent of GDP 
in 2011.
On the monetary front, 
•	 Price stability was the main objective 
of the government’s inflation targeting 
framework. During the early months of 
2010, concerns emerged about possible 
inflationary pressure and the government 
gradually tightened the interest rate 
policy through five successive rate 
increases. After May, with the slowing of 
growth, the rate remained unchanged.
•	 Government’s intervention in the 
foreign exchange market was mainly 
aimed at smoothing large exchange rate 
movements, not resisting fundamental 
trends.
•	 The government continued to strengthen 
the monetary transmission mechanism, 
such as the link between government’s 
policy rate and retail rate of banks, 
through encouragement of a developing 
market for Dram instruments. The law 
on third party liability insurance passed 
in June 2010, and the law on private 
investment funds – passed in December 
– are expected to promote market 
development.
•	 To reduce dollarization in bank 
deposits, in September, the government 
raised from one quarter to one half 
the proportion of required reserves 
on foreign currency deposits to be 
maintained in Drams. 
These were the 2010 across-the-board fiscal and 
monetary policies – some timely, others too late 
to be effective. However, it was the real economic 
sector that called out for and did not receive 
fundamental, profound, real resettings. 
 
THE ECONOMIC PICTURE
Armenia’s economy is clearly not out of the woods. 
After a whopping 14.4 percent decline in 2009, the 
economy appeared to be modestly recovering in the 
first two quarters of 2010, registering 5.4 and 7.6 
percent real GDP growth on a year-on-year basis. 
The January to September cumulative GDP growth, 
however, was a mere 2.8 percent, meaning that 
during the third quarter, the economy experienced 
negative growth. In October, the decline continued 
bringing cumulative GDP growth for the year to 
date to 2.4 percent. 
Despite promises and tacit attempts to institute 
structural reforms, and diversify the economy, little 
was achieved in 2010. The main macro deficiencies 
of the Armenian economy, namely unsustainable 
growth drivers, a narrow and resource dominated 
export base, and overdependence on private 
transfers were still prevalent. 
That the Gross Domestic Product went up by 
2.8 percent in the period January to September 
2010 compared to the same period in 2009, on 
the face of it, seems to indicate that the worst of 
the crisis may be over. Yet, there was a significant 
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third quarter decline, mostly caused by a negative 
trend in agriculture. The projected annual growth 
rate, between 2.5 percent and 2.9 percent is far 
from the double-digit growth rates recorded in the 
pre-crisis era. Official unemployment figures have 
fallen slightly from 7.3 percent to 7.1 percent in the 
January to September period.  
Despite promises and tacit attempts 
to institute structural reforms, and 
diversify the economy, little was 
achieved in 2010 
The volume of gross agricultural output drastically 
decreased from January to September of this year 
compared to the same period in the previous year. 
The huge 17.9 percent decline can be explained 
by bad weather – violent rain and hail delayed 
planting of staples such as potatoes and tomatoes 
and decreased the yield of high-end crops such as 
apricots and cherries. Even though the start of the 
year was promising, with a slight increase in the 
first quarter of 3.2 percent compared to the same 
period in the previous year, 2010 went into decline 
in the summer. The drop in output was 13.1 percent 
by mid-year. It dropped further by September, 
following the disastrous harvest for most products, 
except grapes, where production increased by 
10-15,000 tons to 215,000 metric tons. Meat 
production too fell in January-August 2010 by 11.5 
percent or 3,500 tons compared to the same period 
in 2009.
Although bad weather is generally a part of 
Armenia’s agricultural picture, the huge drop this 
year can be explained by two additional factors. 
First, the government stimulus largely ignored this 
sector which comprises on average 25 percent of 
Armenia’s GDP. Second, the continuing effects of 
decreased subsidies, per WTO requirements are 
visible in the output figures.  
The only area which demonstrated solid growth was 
the wine and spirits industry thanks to several new 
investments both in production facilities and new 
vineyards. Attempts were also made at consolidation 
by forming consortia and cooperatives to protect 
and promote names and standards. Further 
development of this sector will hinge on the export 
readiness of Armenian producers and increased 
local and international demand, especially in Russia.
Industrial output was relatively positive throughout 
2010. Overall, Armenia is second in the CIS 
industrial growth rankings with year-on-year 
average achievement of 10.9 percent in the period 
January to September 2010, due largely to the 
mining sector where higher global demand for 
commodities led to higher prices.
Construction figures fluctuated throughout the 
year. A 5.2 percent year-on-year decrease for the 
January to September period is an indication of 
the unsustainability of a sector based on an elite 
market, with few products for the median or low 
budgets.  This decrease comes despite the fact 
that an important component of the government 
stimulus package was support to this sector to finish 
incomplete projects.   
Retail trade turnover has largely been unaltered 
compared to the previous year. The monopolies 
extant throughout the retail sector have made the 
sector non-responsive to the crisis and resulted in 
near zero growth. The crisis aftermath has started 
to shift the structure in the retail sector in favor of 
food products. 
Unlike retail products, the volume of services has 
increased as much as 7.4 percent from January to 
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September, over the same period last year.  The 
tourism sector saw the completion of the Tatev 
Revival Project in Armenia’s southern Syunik 
region. That revolved around the restoration 
and conservation of the Tatev 14th century 
monastery complex which is a UNESCO World 
Heritage Candidate site. The project included 
the  construction of what turned out to be 
the longest aerial tramway in the world at its 
centerpiece. It is too early to tell whether and how 
this project, financed by an individual investor, will 
affect the region’s overall tourism capacity. 
In the tourism sector generally, a weak support 
service base combined with high price margins 
added to the adverse consequences of the global 
economic crisis. Still, overall, inbound tourism over 
the period January to September 2010 increased by 
15.6 percent compared to same period last year. 
The external trade turnover improved in 2010. 
The three first quarters registered positive change 
compared to the previous year. However, the third 
quarter increase was lower. Armenia’s foreign trade 
with European Union member states in January-
September 2010 surged by 29.1 percent year-on-
year to over one billion dollars, indicating deeper 
trade integration. Overall, EU countries accounted 
for 32.1 percent of Armenia’s foreign trade. 
Germany is Armenia’s largest trading partner among 
EU member states, due largely to mining exports 
and accounting for 7.2 percent of trade. Armenian 
exports to EU countries have skyrocketed by 65.9 
percent, making up more than half of all 2010 
January to September exports. Imports from EU 
countries increased by 17.1 percent, constituting 
22.5 percent of all imports. 
For overall exports, there was a 43.9 percent 
increase in the January to September period, over 
the same period last year. Indeed, the total value of 
exports in January to September was nearly the same 
as the total for all of 2009. The main three export 
destinations were Bulgaria with 15.2 percent of total 
exports, followed by Germany with 14.2 percent 
and Russia with 13.9 percent. With raw minerals 
being sent to Bulgaria and Germany, it is clear that 
in 2010, Armenia’s exports remained resource-
dependent, largely because the non-resource-
intensive sectors were significantly less competitive. 
Armenia has not succeeded in increasing and 
diversifying exports beyond raw materials thus 
leaving room for a greater vulnerability to external 
shocks.
The economic crisis has had less impact on imports 
because the sector is more diversified than exports. 
In the first nine months of 2010, imports grew 
about 19 percent, just about equal to the decline of 
the same sector in 2009.  
The government stimulus largely 
ignored agricultural sector which 
comprises on average 25 percent of  
Armenia’s GDP
Net private transfers, which decreased in 2009, saw 
a continuous increase during the first six months 
of 2010. Since private transfers from the Diaspora 
tend to be mostly injected into consumption of 
imports and not in high value-added sectors, the 
transfers have not resulted in sizeable increases in 
productivity.  
The AMD/USD exchange rate depreciated by 6.1 
percent in the first three quarters of 2010 compared 
to the same period in 2009, before it began to 
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show the expected end-of-the-year appreciation. 
In a comparison between the January to October 
periods of 2010 and 2009, depreciation stands at 
4.7 percent.
State budget revenue – incomes and official transfers 
– increased 19.2 percent in the first nine months of 
2010, compared to 2009. Expenditures increased at a 
slower rate than revenues – 4.6 percent in the January 
to September period. Overall, a total of 580.8 billion 
AMD were collected in taxes and customs duties 
– 37.8 billion more than projected. This represents 
a 15.5 percent jump over 2009. In addition, there 
was a 9.5 percent increase in the collection rate of 
mandatory social security payments. 
The decrease in construction comes 
despite the fact that an important 
component of  the government 
stimulus package was support to this 
sector to finish incomplete projects
Total taxes paid by Armenia’s largest corporate 
taxpayers grew by 18 percent. However, the increase 
was more a result of indirect tax revenues (VAT 
and excise taxes) which increased by 29 percent 
because there was greater economic activity and 
less of it stayed in the shadows. On the other hand, 
direct taxes fell by 5.5 percent, indicating a drop 
in corporate profitability. Compared to January to 
September 2009, the share of direct taxes paid by 
the largest taxpayers decreased from 26 percent to 
21 percent. Nevertheless, reliance on big business 
essentially means that monopolistic prices are 
frequently set for many goods.
With regard to external national debt, Armenia 
was removed from the World Bank list of low-debt 
countries. By the end of 2010, Armenia’s external 
debt is projected to form about 42 percent of GDP, 
and 50 percent in 2012. This already large number 
becomes even more overwhelming when compared 
to 2008, when the public external debt consisted of 
just 13.5 percent of GDP. 
Inflation has seen a significant increase in the first nine 
months of 2010 and has therefore been the object of 
tight monetary regulation. It is among the highest in 
the CIS (January-September 2010 compared to 2009)  
– 7.8 percent compared to 5.2 percent in Azerbaijan, 
for example. The rise is due largely to 
•	 high food and commodity prices on 
world markets
•	 the prolonged impact of fiscal and 
monetary expansionary policies adopted 
in 2009 as a response to the crisis 
•	 overall negative expectations caused by 
the 2009 Dram devaluation. 
The Consumer Price Index too bounced between 
seven and 8.5 percent higher in the January to 
September period, over the same time last year. 
Throughout 2010, consecutive monthly increases 
in CPI fluctuated around 2.5 percent.   The increase 
in retail agricultural prices was 17.7 percent for the 
first half of the year, then soared to 26 percent for 
the January to September period, after a miserable 
harvest.
The banking sector remained stable and banks 
earned around $55 million in 2010. In the first three 
quarters of 2010, the banking system’s assets grew 
seven percent year-on-year, while liabilities grew eight 
percent and total capital increased by 10 percent.
Deposits in foreign currency increased an average 
of 26.4 percent in the first three quarters of 2010, 
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compared to the same period last year, whereas time 
deposits in AMD increased only 10 percent. This 
means that in contrast to the Dramization trend 
evident between 2003 and 2007, there is now a 
movement toward dollarization. 
Interest rates are still higher than in the pre-
crisis period. This is a consequence of the crisis 
highlighting existing economic and financial risks. 
It’s also due to inflationary pressures. Interest on 
deposits increased from 8.3 percent in the second 
quarter this year to 9.3 percent in the third quarter 
whereas interest rates on loans recorded a slight 
decrease from 19.5 percent to 18.8 percent. Before 
the crisis, in the third quarter of 2008 for example, 
interest on loans was 16.7 percent.  
Loans have not been easily available for those living 
in remote and border areas, although financial 
constraints resulting from the economic crisis 
have resulted in an acute need for additional loans, 
especially in major sectors of the economy such as 
agriculture, construction and industry. Still, the 
loan portfolio of commercial banks was 724 million 
AMD as of September 2009 and 848 million as 
of September 2010. This last number is nearly 30 
percent higher than the amount in circulation in 
the same period in 2008. This expansion of the 
loan portfolio is driven by private sector need while 
lending to households decreased. Most banks froze 
granting of mortgages and consumer credits.  
INSTITUTIONAL MATTERS
The urgent need for institutional reform has 
not diminished. Even as a second generation of 
structural reforms is officially proceeding, very little 
progress is noticeable. The country is still unable 
to move to a higher level of free market values and 
risks consolidating further the already entrenched 
informal ties and practices. The danger for Armenia 
is that if things continue as they are, the country 
may fall into an institutional trap: the informal 
rules of the game may become formalized and 
transparent, predictable rules and an even playing 
field may be out of reach.
The best example of that danger is the widespread 
co-mingling of politics and business. This results in 
the creation of business groups and conglomerates 
that dominate various branches of the economy and 
goods markets, all the while enjoying tax advantages 
because of their political status or connections.
As in previous years, so too this year, according to 
the results of the World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Report, the lowest scores for 
Armenia were for its competitive environment: All 
three scores are in the lowest tier among the 139 
countries studied. Moreover, Armenia is next to last 
in the effectiveness of its anti-monopoly policy.
Germany is Armenia’s largest 
trading partner among EU member 
states, due largely to mining exports 
and accounting for 7.2 percent of  
trade
Those scores are evidence of the lack of essential 
change in the status of markets in Armenia, despite 
pronouncements at the highest levels of government 
on the importance of free competition.
Parallel to all that, the government is nevertheless 
taking steps to strengthen the institutional 
capabilities of the economic competitiveness 
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protection sub-commission. The evidence of that 
is the new package of legislative reforms proposed 
for this year, which includes (a) strengthening 
the sub-commission’s powers to prevent anti-
competitiveness and (b) resolving the matter of 
the sub-commission’s financial independence. A 
three-year strategic plan has been adopted and if 
implemented, the sub-commission would assume an 
entirely different institutional form.
Those efforts are condemned to failure so long as 
one of the most important factors distorting the 
competitive playing field has not been resolved: the 
shadow economy. The struggle against it is outside 
the purview of the sub-commission. Moreover, the 
informal rules of the game as they exist directly 
prohibit the sub-commission from functioning 
productively. Evidence of that is the sub-
commission’s campaign against anti-competitive 
agreements in the drug market, which resulted in 
first-time-ever penalties against seven large firms 
that import drugs. However, that 2010 decision was 
overturned by the sub-commission’s new leadership.
As in previous years, so too this 
year, according to the results of  the 
Global Competitiveness Report, the 
lowest scores for Armenia were for 
its competitive environment
The tax and customs sectors remain among the 
fundamental obstacles to a favorable business 
environment and free competition. Understanding 
this reality, major donor organizations offer 
special attention and serious financial support to 
both agencies, in the form of financing, technical 
support, introduction of e-signatures and 
e-governance and other programs.
Despite such backing, business circles don’t notice 
real change in the approach of the revenue services. 
So long as agencies are still saddled with plans, or 
quotas for the collection of revenues, agency heads 
will naturally deploy the resources available to them 
to collect those amounts. When the privileged status 
of many large companies is factored into the mix, it’s 
clear why big business is not taxed in proportion to 
its capacity and output, and why the disproportionate 
burden falls on small and medium size businesses. 
This is confirmed by a report by finance ministry 
experts, based on the officially published list of the 
1,000 largest taxpayers. This multifaceted study finds 
that big business’s capabilities remain undisclosed. 
Thus, the logical path to resolving the revenue 
challenge is to ease the burden of tax and customs 
payments from small and medium size businesses and 
ensure fair implementation.
In 2010, the government attempted to implement 
the provisions of the amended 2008-2011 strategic 
plan for tax collection, to which temporary 
corrections had been made because of the global 
economic crisis. The main emphasis is on easing 
the tax obligation of taxpayers and the reduction of 
corruption by essentially reducing the transactional 
expenses of paying taxes by centralizing and making 
tax reporting and filing processes more uniform, as 
well as introducing electronic tax-filing.
To achieve more efficient tax collection,  
•	 The government intends to work toward 
risk-based assessments for selection of 
taxpayers for audits
•	 The government will also use risk-based 
assessments to facilitate VAT refunds for 
a majority of (non-risk) exporters. 
•	 The work of tax collection bodies will be 
made more transparent by increasing the 
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knowledge base of businesses, especially 
small and medium. The tax agencies of 
Arabkir and Vanadzor will open service 
centers for this purpose.
•	 Rules for operating small businesses are 
being simplified and those with annual 
incomes of up to six million AMD will be 
exempted from the graduated tax system.
To achieve more effective customs collection, and to 
ease the burden on exporters and importers as well 
as transactional expenses,
•	 the State Revenue Service website will 
publish the complete list of documents 
required, by type of product, for foreign 
trade, as well as documents regarding 
post-clearance audit procedures
•	 an automated customs system will be 
installed
•	 risk management in the realm of post-
clearance monitoring will be more 
efficiently utilized.
The programs above as well as other efforts by the 
government to reform the business environment 
in Armenia are apparently insufficient, as evidenced 
by the results of the 2011 Doing Business Report 
issued of the World Bank. This is not for lack of 
trying, but for focusing on the less critical and less 
serious problems and resisting tackling the large 
entrenched obstacles, most of which are “profit 
centers” for low, mid and high-level officials. 
In eight  of the nine topic areas comprising the 
“overall ease of doing business,” Armenia ranked 
lower in 2011 than in 2010. The one area in which 
Armenia registered progress was “Trading Across 
Borders,” which went up 21 points, occupying a 
still-too-low 82nd place. That growth is the result 
of the simplification of customs procedures, the 
implementation of an electronic declaration system, 
and other institutional reforms.
Just as in the tax and customs sectors, reforms 
are being introduced in this sector, too, aimed 
at eliminating bureaucratic obstacles to starting 
a business and entering a market—both to save 
business people time and money and to strengthen 
competition in certain goods markets. That’s 
the intent, in particular, behind the efforts to 
implement the “one-stop window” for starting a 
corporation and their electronic registration, to 
noticeably decrease the number of activities that 
require licensing, and to overhaul construction-
permit procedures. This remains a good idea, even if 
it is now being introduced yet again. This idea, after 
all, was the one of the reasons for the creation of the 
Armenian Development Agency – one institution 
that’s not a part of any strategy plans.  
The tax and customs sectors remain 
among the fundamental obstacles to 
a favorable business environment 
and free competition
The Corporate Governance Rulebook being 
developed by the Ministry of Economy is viewed as 
important to the process of corporate governance 
formation in Armenia. It’s intended to regulate 
the activities of not only private corporations but 
also government-owned enterprises to assure more 
efficient management of government assets.
Although the financial sector in Armenia is stable, 
it is still insufficient to promote the country’s 
economic competitiveness. Evidence of that is 
the Global Competitiveness Report, according to 
which Armenia’s financial market numbers 110 
in terms of development, out of 139 countries 
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studied; the third most important obstacle for 
launching a business, according to the report, is the 
unavailability of financial resources. The large spread 
between interest rates for savings and for credit, 
as well as the small size of the total loan portfolios 
in proportion to the GDP are evidence that the 
financial system cannot adequately influence the 
real sector of the economy.
Two new programs introduced this year – 
compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance and a 
restructuring of the state pension system – will help 
market development for Dram instruments.
Compulsory motor-vehicle liability insurance will 
serve two purposes. The first is to introduce rules 
and predictability in the institutional realm dealing 
with motor-vehicle accidents. The second reason, 
and the one more consequential for the economy, is 
to develop the insurance sector.
The large spread between interest 
rates for savings and for credit, as 
well as the small size of  the total 
loan portfolios in proportion to the 
GDP are evidence that the financial 
system cannot adequately influence 
the real sector of  the economy
There is no unanimity among experts regarding the 
timing of the compulsory regulation, nevertheless, 
the nearly 450,000 automobiles registered in 
Armenia must, as of January 2011, be insured.  
 
Parallel with the quick growth of the insurance 
market, the sector consolidated and the number of 
insurance companies has reduced by three, and now 
totals nine. Future legislation will probably tackle 
compulsory health insurance as well as policies to 
cover construction-related issues.
The other new introduction, pension reform 
is among the most complex, and socially most 
significant, undertaking in Armenia as elsewhere. 
Its proper, farsighted and ethical formulation and 
implementation will mean economic and social 
stability for the state. Pension reform in Armenia is 
essential given that the official worker to pensioner 
ratio is an alarmingly low one to one, and given the 
consequences of the country’s low birth rate in the 
early 1990s. 
Starting in 2011, Armenia will have a new multi-tiered 
pension system. The funds must  be invested in stable, 
income generating deposits, with the fundamental 
mission of “securing tomorrow’s old age today.”
However, numerous issues and concerns regarding 
implementation are already being raised having 
to do with (a) the lack of maturity  of Armenia’s 
institutions, particularly the financial system; (b) 
the capacity to return the invested sums in the 
future; (c) the additional tax burden on the public 
and the employers; (d) the proper execution of 
obligations assumed by the government; (e) the 
high levels of corruption in the country.
Of course, because these systems are both new 
to Armenia, they will have shortcomings which 
will become apparent as they are implemented. 
However, arguably the most critical and 
economically consequential question is where and 
how these funds will be invested. This concern is 
most relevant to the pension system simply because 
of the scale of that program. Would those sums flow 
out of the country for the purpose of reinsurance 
or investment in other funds, or would they remain 
in-country? Of course, from the country’s point of 
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view, keeping the funds in Armenia is preferable. 
The fundamental question, however, is whether the 
real sector of the economy is sufficiently developed 
to absorb the accumulated resources. If not, those 
funds, which will have accumulated at the expense 
of current consumption, will most likely flow out 
of the country and help finance other governments 
and corporations.
Thus, the institutions are faced with a double dilemma: 
the success of financial sector reforms is immediately 
dependent on fundamental transformations in the 
real sector so as to facilitate the ability of the economy 
to absorb and use the additional funds. On the other 
hand, the real sector requires additional funding and 
mediation in order to grow.   
OUTLOOK
In 2011, the global economy will grow moderately 
but geographically unevenly. China and India will 
grow around six  to eight percent, raising inflation 
fears, which will trigger some growth dampening 
measures. Europe and the US will grow one to three 
percent. The dominant global economic challenge 
will be debt and deficit reduction. Europe will 
continue to be challenged by sovereign debt issues 
in the periphery countries. How all this plays out 
will impact other countries, including Armenia.
Russia, Armenia’s main trade and economic partner, 
will be affected by these developments. Despite 
high oil prices, the Russian economy will grow 
moderately, thus generating commensurate foreign 
direct investments and remittances for Armenia. 
Armenia’s economic growth will remain anemic. 
Despite moderate global growth, there will still be 
lagging effects on Armenia’s economy. Additionally, 
as a result of the global crisis, Armenia will be 
burdened with new limitations on growth, such as 
limited borrowing capability, high debt and a high 
budget deficit.
Demand is likely to remain weak, domestically as 
a result of increased unemployment and poverty 
and a decrease in purchasing power, and externally, 
Armenia will remain vulnerable to Russia’s and 
Europe’s moderate growth and Euro depreciation.
Armenia’s budget deficits and external debt will 
remain high despite attempts to bring them down. 
Despite the government’s effort to exercise fiscal 
discipline, 2011 is a pre-election year and for 
political expediency, expenditures will become more 
dominant.   
Promises and serious efforts notwithstanding, the 
government will remain incapable of implementing 
crucial second-generation reforms, in order not 
to challenge politically powerful businessmen, 
especially in a pre-election year.
Discriminatory tax collection policy combined with 
huge concentration in certain sectors will continue 
to drive out small and medium business owners, 
further shrinking the field and limiting competition.
POLICY OPTIONS
The government has exhausted and utilized all fiscal 
and monetary options. Therefore, in 2011, to create 
new fiscal space, the government has no choice but 
to tackle politically sensitive reforms with clear 
economic implications.
The government should shift gears away from 
macroeconomic policy to reform policy. The 
fundamental impediments to economic growth are 
the lack of diversity and competitiveness, as well as 
interdependence of businessmen and government 
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officials. Reform in these areas ought to be the 
government’s focus.    
The various economic indexes published by 
international agencies must be taken seriously. 
They are useful not just for their general ratings, 
but for the detailed explanations of indicators and 
categories. To improve competitiveness, government 
focus should be on strengthening institutions, 
education, labor, goods and markets efficiency, and 
technological readiness.
The European Union Association Agreement offers 
a tremendous opportunity for real reforms, changes, 
growth in very specific areas that would hugely 
support economic competitiveness. The Agreement 
allows Armenia to take away as much as it wants 
in the way of new measures, regulations, standards. 
Armenia should take hold of the chance to revisit 
and revise practices regarding standardization 
and intellectual property rights in order to foster 
innovation and competitiveness, not just in the 
European markets.
The leadership must leave behind the reactive 
emergency mode thinking of the last two years and 
re-focus on overall growth. The government’s main 
policy document – the Sustainable Development 
Program – requires serious revision, given the new 
economic conditions created as a result of the 
economic decline of the past two years.
A second import substitution strategy is needed, 
to take the earlier (2000-2005) attempt to a higher 
level, to address various sectors, from food products 
to high-tech instruments and hardware. This is 
essential to ameliorate the external balance.
Despite government pronouncements that 
interference in the exchange rate is only to smooth 
the variations, there is still resistance to fundamental 
trends. The Dram ought to be left to itself, to 
depreciate sufficiently to create a monetary situation 
beneficial to exports and increase the purchasing 
power of the population, especially those dependent 
on outside remittances.
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ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN GEORGIA
GDP 
Growth: 
2.9 percent
Inflation: 
8 percent
GDP:  
$8.8 bn
GDP per 
capita: 
$2676 
(PPP $5178)
Population: 
3.2 m
Outlook: Armenia’s 
economy will benefit 
from growing remittances, 
especially from Russia as 
commodity prices continue 
to rebound. Growth is 
expected to hover around 
three percent in 2011, 
with inflation returning 
to the four to five percent 
range. The current account 
balance may also improve 
by a couple of percentage 
points down from the 
current -14.5%, while 
gross government debt will 
continue to rise to 50% of 
GDP. 
 
Politically, 2011 will 
be considered a pre-
election year, although 
the May 2012 elections 
are 18 months off. 
This environment will 
exacerbate tensions 
between government and  
opposition. The various 
parties in and out of the 
coalition will start to 
position themselves for the 
elections. On the one hand, 
this will compound the 
uncertainty; on the other, 
if some political forces take 
bold and creative steps to 
create more acceptable and 
sensible political unions, 
there may be hope for a 
responsive system.  
 
In foreign policy, All 
issues will revolve around 
the Karabakh conflict, 
including relations with 
Turkey, which this year will 
be a more subdued theme 
due mainly to Turkish 
elections in 2011.
GDP 
Growth: 
4.3 percent
Inflation: 
6 percent
GDP: 
$52 bn
GDP per 
capita: 
$5764  
(PPP $9953)
Population: 
9 m
Outlook: Azerbaijan’s 
economy is expected 
to grow further due to 
improving conditions 
in global commodity 
markets. Although 
dependence on 
commodities may have 
shielded the country from 
the effects of the global 
crisis, the country still 
sustains serious structural 
weaknesses including its 
heavy dependence on the 
oil and gas sector. Still, 
Azerbaijan’s economy will 
grow around five percent. 
The main challenges 
facing the country are 
to radically improve the 
business climate, promote 
strategic sectors and 
investments and reform 
the financial sector. 
 
Politically, having 
concluded parliamentary 
elections in 2010, no 
new political events are 
on the horizon. The 
domestic scene, though 
not free, is stable, with 
President Aliyev and his 
party and supporters 
dominating the political 
and economic fields. 
Increased revenues and a 
more visible role in world 
energy trade will continue 
to feed Azerbaijan’s 
more assertive stances on 
regional and international 
issues, including 
Karabakh. Azerbaijan’s 
military rhetoric vis-à-vis 
Karabakh will escalate 
in inverse proportion to 
progress in the Karabakh 
talks.
GDP  
Growth: 
5.5 percent
Inflation: 
10 percent
GDP:  
$11.2 bn 
 
GDP per 
capita: 
$2559  
(PPP $5057)
Population: 
4.4m
Outlook: Georgia’s 
economy is expected to 
slow down slightly in 2011 
due to limited FDI inflows 
and continuing need for 
further structural reforms 
and strengthening of the 
financial system. Domestic 
demand will continue 
to be encouraged by 
expansionary policies and 
lending programs. 
Current account deficit 
will persist at around 
12 percent while public 
debt will increase to 48 
percent of GDP. Public 
debt and inflation control 
will remain two of the 
key challenges along 
with enforcing the rule 
of law and improving the 
investment environment. 
 
Politically, the opposition 
will try to consolidate and 
will continue to challenge 
the administration in the 
run up to parliamentary 
elections in 2012. 
Nevertheless, President 
Saakashvili will retain 
power and stability. 
Georgia will also continue 
to develop closer relations 
and deeper integration 
with the EU. On foreign 
policy, relations with 
Russia will remain frozen, 
and Georgia will continue 
to deepen relations with 
Turkey and Azerbaijan.
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*All indicators represent estimates for 2010.
Sources: The World Bank, IMF World Economic Outlook, EBRD, the Economist, E & V Research Center,
RUSSIA TURKEY IRAN
GDP 
Growth: 
4 percent
Inflation: 
8 percent
GDP: 
$1476 bn 
GDP per 
capita: 
$10521 
(PPP  
$15806)
Population: 
140.3 m
Outlook: Russia’s recovery 
from the crisis has been 
conditioned by a large 
fiscal intervention, stronger 
commodity prices as 
well as market demand. 
In 2011, the economy is 
expected to grow only 
marginally by half or one 
point as structural and 
other weaknesses persist 
despite the government’s 
strive for modernization of 
industry and diversification 
of the economy, with a 
focus on the banking and 
high technology sectors. 
Deregulation and reforms, 
as well as careful fiscal 
consolidation, will be 
important for achieving 
sustainable growth. 
 
The Medvedev- Putin 
tandem will dominate the 
political scene, displaying 
real or perceptions of 
competition. Until the 
fall, it won’t be clear who 
will be the one candidate 
for the next presidential 
race. In the Caucasus, 
Russia will continue to 
reinforce and consolidate 
its influence. In global 
policy, Russia will continue 
to challenge US supremacy 
and may try to work with 
other emerging powers 
to create a second pole to 
counterbalance to US.
GDP 
Growth: 
7.8 percent
Inflation: 
8.2 percent
GDP: 
$729 bn
GDP per 
capita: 
$10206  
(PPP 
$13392)
Population: 
71.5 m
Outlook: The Turkish 
economy’s resilience during 
this financial crisis can 
be attributed not only 
to improving external 
conditions and demand 
but also to fiscal prudence, 
privatizations and ongoing 
reforms. Political reforms 
and a strong government 
also seem to have restored 
confidence. In 2011, growth 
will decrease closer to the 
averages of developed 
countries, and inflation will 
be lower.
Politically, this is a critical 
year for Turkey. Their 2011 
parliamentary elections 
will result with the ruling 
AK Party in the lead, albeit 
with probably a reduced 
majority. Depending on the 
strength of that majority, 
their policies regarding 
EU integration, regional 
expansion, Cyprus, Armenia 
and the Kurds will all be 
affected.  
GDP 
Growth: 
1.5 percent
Inflation: 
8 percent
GDP: 
$338 bn
GDP per 
capita: 
$4484 
(PPP 
$11024)
Population: 
75.3 m
Outlook: Stability in 
international commodity 
markets has maintained 
the status quo in Iran’s 
economy, with slight 
improvements in GDP. 
The economy is expected 
to expand at about 
three percent in spite of 
renewed international 
pressures and sanctions 
over its nuclear program. 
Stronger demand on the 
other hand will create new 
inflationary pressures in 
2011. 
 
Domestically, despite 
post-election instability, 
the government is more 
confident. Still, within 
power structures, tension 
between the presidency 
and the religious 
leadership will become 
more evident and can lead 
to further government 
reshuffling and efforts for 
both side’s influence.  
 
In foreign relations, 
Iran will continue to 
be intransigent on the 
nuclear issue, and with the 
nuclear negotiator being 
named foreign minister, 
that matter will remain 
Iran’s number one foreign 
policy goal. Nevertheless, 
the West will attempt to 
increase the pressure on 
Iran, which will result in 
increased worries in the 
region.  
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